

Certificate Policy for OCES Personal  
Certificates ("Offentlige Certifikater til  
Elektronisk Service")

Version 4

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## **Rights**

The Danish National IT and Telecom Agency holds all rights to this certificate policy (CP), the OCES name and OCES-OID. Use of the OCES-OID term in certificates and the issue of OCES certificates are only permitted following written agreement with the National IT and Telecom Agency.

## **Preface**

This certificate policy is a translation of the Danish version of the certificate policy issued and administered by the National IT and Telecom Agency in Denmark. In case of doubt as to the understanding and interpretation of the certificate policy, the original Danish version shall take precedence.

The National IT and Telecom Agency is the public authority which authorises the issue of OCES personal certificates for the selected certification authorities (CAs), and which is in charge of the approval of CAs in relation to this CP.

The National IT and Telecom Agency is also responsible for the content of this CP. The most recent version of this CP as well as earlier versions under which valid certificates are still in existence can be found at [www.digitalsignatur.dk](http://www.digitalsignatur.dk).

Please direct inquiries regarding digital signatures to the National IT and Telecom Agency. For further information, see [www.digitalsignatur.dk](http://www.digitalsignatur.dk).

## **Introduction**

A digital signature is an electronic signature that may be used in various situations, for instance when it is essential to know who you are communicating with electronically. The use of digital signatures presupposes that a public key infrastructure (PKI) has been established.

OCES is such a public key infrastructure. OCES is short for "Offentlige Certifikater til Elektronisk Service" (*Public Certificates for Electronic Services*). The National IT and Telecom Agency has prepared four OCES certificate policies (CPs), applicable to personal, employee, company and functional certificates, respectively. The CPs constitute a common public standard regulating the issue and use of the digital OCES signature. Thus the CPs specify requirements for the public key infrastructure, and hence the level of security applicable to the digital signature.

The digital signature can be used when a person has been identified and registered under a certification authority (CA). The CA grants the individual a personal electronic certificate containing this individual's public key. The CP specifies requirements as to how and under what conditions the CA will perform these tasks.

The common public standard does not regulate qualified certificates issued pursuant to Act No. 417 of 31 May 2000 on Electronic Signatures.

## 1 Overview and scope

This certificate policy (CP) describes the guidelines that apply to the issue of an OCES personal certificate, OCES being an abbreviation of "Offentlige Certifikater til Elektronisk Service" (*Public Certificates for Electronic Services*).

The CP has been prepared by the public authority primarily responsible for this area, i.e. the National IT and Telecom Agency, and specifies the Agency's minimum requirements for systems and agreements that must be met by the certification authorities (CAs) in relation to their "customers", i.e. subscribers and verifiers (relying parties), when acting as commercial providers of certificates. The purpose of the certificate policy is to ensure that the signatures can be used in a manner satisfactory to all parties.

This CP has been prepared on the basis of the guidelines given in ETSI TS 102 042 V1.3.4 (2007-12): "*Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates*".

The rules of the certificate policy regulating the CA's activities provide a high level of security that the subscriber has the identity indicated in the certificate.

A certificate is only an OCES certificate if it has been issued according to an OCES CP, and has been issued by a certification authority (CA) approved by the National IT and Telecom Agency as an issuer of OCES personal certificates. As an element in the approval, a formal agreement is made between the CA and the National IT and Telecom Agency in which the CA undertakes to fulfil the requirements of this CP, including the requirement that the CA's handling of tasks should be audited, see also section 7.1.

A CP is part of the contractual basis existing between the National IT and Telecom Agency and the individual certification authority (CA) regarding the right to issue OCES certificates.

Thus the subscribers and verifiers (relying parties) may base their trust on the certificate policy, the National IT and Telecom Agency's approval of the CA, and the Agency's ongoing supervision of this.

Certification authorities (CAs) entitled to issue certificates under this CP (OCES personal certificates) are published on the National IT and Telecom Agency's website on digital signatures: <https://www.digitalsignatur.dk>.

## 2 References

Act No. 417 of 31 May 2000: Lov om elektroniske signaturer (*Act on Electronic Signatures*)

Act No. 429 of 31 May 2000: Lov om behandling af personoplysninger (*Act on Processing of Personal Data*)

Consolidated Act No. 442 of 11 May 2007: Bekendtgørelse af lov om forebyggende foranstaltninger mod hvidvask af udbytte og finansiering af terrorisme (*Consolidated Act on Measures to Prevent Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism*)

CEN Workshop Agreement 14167-2:2002: "*Security Requirements for Trustworthy Systems Managing Certificates for Electronic Signatures - part 2: Cryptographic Module for CSP Signing Operations - Protection Profile (MCSO-PP)*"

CWA 14167-1:2003: "*Security Requirements for Trustworthy Systems Managing Certificates for Electronic Signatures - Part 1: System Security Requirements*"

CWA 14167-2:2004: "*Cryptographic module for CSP signing operations with backup - Protection profile - CMCSOB PP*"

DS (Danish Standard) 2391:1995 "Registrering af identifikatorer i datanetværk" (*Registration of Identifiers in Communication Network*), Parts 1 and 3

DS (Danish Standard) 844: "Specifikation for kvalificerede certifikater" (*Specification for qualified certificates*)

DS (Danish Standard) 471:1993: "Teknisk forebyggelse af indbrudskriminalitet" (*Technical Prevention against Burglar Attack*)

DS (Danish Standard) 484:2005: "Dansk standard for Informationssikkerhed DS 484" (*Code of practice for information security management*)

ETSI TS 102 042 V1.3.4 (2007-12): "*Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates*"

ETSI TS 102 176-1 V2.0.0 (2007-11): "*Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures; Part 1: Hash functions and asymmetric algorithms*"

ETSI TS 102 176-2 V1.2.1 (2005-07): "*Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures; Part 2: Secure channel protocols and algorithms for signature creation devices*"

ETSI TS 101 862 V1.3.3 (2006-01): "*Qualified Certificate profile*"

FIPS PUB 140-2 (2001): "*Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*"



ISO/IEC 15408 (parts 1 to 3) 2005: *"Information technology -Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security"*

ISO/IEC 9794-8/ITU-T Recommendation X.509: *"Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks"*

Requests for Comments:

- RFC 3039: *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Qualified Certificates Profile*
- RFC 3280: *Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile*
- RFC 5019: *The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments*

In case of discrepancy between the references above and this CP, the provisions of this CP shall be applicable to the CA unless otherwise provided by law.

## 3 Definitions and abbreviations

### 3.1 Definitions

This section contains definitions of specific terms used in this CP. Danish terms are given in parentheses.

**Activation Password:** Code used for activating the signature when generating and installing keys

**Password/personal password:** A personal code kept secret by the subscriber and used by the subscriber when applying a digital signature.

**Public key certificate/certificate** (*certifikat*): An electronic certificate, which specifies the subscriber's public key together with additional information, and which unambiguously links the public key to the identification of the subscriber. A public key certificate must be signed by a certification authority (CA), which thus confirms the validity of the certificate.

**Subscriber** (*certifikatindehaver*): A natural person entering into an agreement with the issuing certification authority (CA), and to whom an OCES certificate is being issued, or has been issued.

**Certification authority (CA)** (*certificeringscenter*): A natural or legal person authorised to generate, issue and manage certificates.<sup>1</sup>

**Certification practice statement (CPS)** (*certificeringspraksis*): A specification of the principles and procedures which a CA employs in issuing certificates.

**Certificate policy** (*certifikatpolitik*): A set of rules that indicates requirements for issuing and using a certificate in one or more specific contexts where common security requirements exist.

**Digital signature:** Data in electronic form used for authenticating other electronic data attached to the digital signature or with which it is logically associated.

**Fingerprint:** A short unique checksum for the certificate.

**OTP device** (*OTP-enhed*): Physical unit which is able to deliver one-time passwords to the user.

**OTP response code** (*OTP-engangskode*): Response code delivered by the OTP.

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<sup>1</sup> The term "key centre" is used for this entity in the Act on Electronic Signatures. However, the terminology has been changed for practical reasons. A certification authority corresponds to a key centre in the Act on Electronic Signatures apart from the fact that the certification authority does not issue qualified certificates, but OCES certificates.

**Private key** (*privat nøgle*): The subscriber's key for applying a digital signature or for decrypting. The private key is personal and is kept secret by the subscriber.

**Key escrow** (*nøgledeponering*): Storing of keys for the purpose of giving third parties access to these in order to decrypt information.

**Cryptographic module**: Hardware module which can generate and store keys and apply the digital signature independently of the operating system. The hardware module must be certified according to FIPS 140-2 level 3, CWA 14167-3 or SSCD-PP Type 3.

**Public-key certificate** (*offentligt certifikat*): See certificate.

**Registration authority (RA)** (*registreringsenhed*): The natural or legal person responsible for the identification and authentication of a (future) subscriber.

**Root certificate** (*rodcertifikat*): A certificate issued by a CA for the purpose of validating other certificates. A root certificate is signed with its own signing key (self signing (*egensignering*)).

**Root key**: The CA's private and public keys used for signing the subject's certificates.

**Verifier (relying party)** (*signaturmodtager*): A natural or legal person receiving signed data from a subscriber.

**Sub-certification of CA**: A higher-level CA issuing a certificate with the public root key of the lower-level CA. Sub-certification may occur at several levels, thus forming a continuous chain of certificates.

**Certificate revocation list** (*spærreliste*): A list of certificates no longer considered valid because they have been permanently revoked.

### 3.2 Abbreviations

CA	Certificate Authority ( <i>Certificeringscenter</i> )
CRL	Certificate Revocation List ( <i>Spærreliste</i> )
CPR	Civil Registration System ( <i>Det Centrale Personregister</i> )
CPS	Certification Practice Statement ( <i>Certificeringspraksis</i> )
CP	Certificate Policy ( <i>Certifikatpolitik</i> )
LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCES	Public Certificates for Electronic Services ( <i>Offentlige Certifikater til Elektronisk Service</i> ).
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier, see ITU-T's ASN.1 standard
OTP	One Time Password
PID	Person-specific Identification Number ( <i>Personspecifikt identifikationsnummer</i> )
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
RA	Registration Authority

UTC            Universal Time, Coordinated

### **3.3 Notation**

The requirements contained in this CP comprise:

- 1    Mandatory requirements, which must be met. Such requirements are indicated using the term "must".
- 2    Requirements that should be met. If the requirements are not met, this must be reasoned. Such requirements are indicated using the term "should".
- 3    Requirements that may be met if the CA so wishes. Such requirements are indicated using the term "may".

## **4 Concept**

### **4.1 CA**

A natural or legal person entrusted by both subscribers and verifiers with the task of generating, issuing and managing electronic certificates is known as a certification authority (CA). The CA has overall responsibility for providing the services necessary for issuing and maintaining certificates. The CA's own private keys are used to sign issued certificates, and the CA is identified in the certificate as the issuer.

The CA may cooperate with other parties in offering parts of the overall CA services, but the CA will always have overall responsibility for all activities regarding the handling of certificates, and the CA is also responsible for the requirements of this CP for CA services being met at all times.

A CA may sub-certify its public OCES root key under other CAs. A CA's OCES root key may also sub-certify another CA's public root key provided that this is approved for OCES.

An OCES CA must always offer a self-signed OCES root certificate to the verifiers (relying parties).

### **4.2 CA services**

The services necessary for issuing and maintaining certificates may be classified as follows:

- **Registration:** Verification of the subscriber's identity and any associated ID and registration information. The result of the registration will be passed on to certificate generation.
- **Generating certificates:** Generation and electronic signing of certificates based on the verified identity and any associated ID and registration information from the registration.
- **Certificate distribution:** Distribution of certificates to subscribers.
- **Catalogue service:** Publication of certificates, giving verifiers (relying parties) access to the certificates.
- **Publication of business conditions etc.:** Publication of terms and rules, including CP and CPS.
- **Revocation of certificates:** Receiving and handling requests for revocation of certificates.
- **Publication of revocation information:** Publication of status information for all certificates, in particular certificates which have been revoked.

### **4.3 CP and CPS**

#### **4.3.1 Purpose**

The purpose of a CP like the present is to specify what requirements must be met, while the purpose of a CPS is to specify how the requirements are met by the relevant CA. The certificate refers to the CP, thus allowing a verifier to determine what

minimum requirements have been met by the CA, including the requirements that a CA must require a subscriber to meet.

#### ***4.3.2 Degree of specification***

The CPS gives a detailed description of conditions and terms, including business and operating procedures, for the issue and maintenance of certificates. Thus the CPS is more detailed than the CP, which describes general requirements only.

The CPS must indicate how a specific CA meets the technical, organisational and procedural requirements identified in this CP.

#### ***4.3.3 Differences***

The approach of a CP is different from a CPS. A CP like the present has for instance been defined independently of specific details in the operating environments of the CA, whereas the CPS is tailored to the organisational structure, operating procedures and IT facilities of the CA. This CP has been prepared by the National IT and Telecom Agency, while the CPS is always prepared by a CA.

An independent third party (system auditor) must make an audit of the CPS and declare that the CPS meets all requirements made in the CP, and that these requirements are observed by the CA.

#### ***4.3.4 Other CA conditions***

The CP and the CPS describe the basic framework for CA's activities. In addition, the CA will typically employ customer-oriented commercial conditions and terms addressing the issue and use of certificates and the provision of status information.

## 5 Certificate policy and auditing

### 5.1 General

This document describes the certificate policy for OCES personal certificates.

### 5.2 Identification

This CP is identified by the following object identifier (OID):

Personal certificate:

```
{ 1 2 208 stat(169) pki(1) cp(1) nq(1) person(1) ver(4) }.
```

The OID is registered under Danish Standards in accordance with DS 2391:1995, parts 1 and 3.

All OCES personal certificates issued according to this CP must refer to it by indicating the relevant OID in the "certificate policy" field of the OCES certificate. In a certificate, reference must only be made to the OIDs in question following written agreement with the National IT and Telecom Agency, cf. section 1.

### 5.3 Scope of application

An OCES personal certificate may be used to secure the authenticity of the sender and message, including the electronic signature and integrity of the message. It may also be used to ensure secrecy (encryption).

OCES personal certificates are not qualified certificates, i.e. they must not be used in situations where qualified certificates are required.

OCES personal certificates must not be used to sign other certificates.

OCES personal certificates may be valid for a maximum period of four years.

### 5.4 The CA's right to issue OCES certificates

The CA may issue OCES personal certificates according to this CP if the CA:

- has entered into a written agreement with the National IT and Telecom Agency in this respect; and
- has submitted a CA report, cf. 5.5, to the National IT and Telecom Agency; and
- has received a declaration of conformity from the National IT and Telecom Agency confirming that the Agency has approved the submitted report and finds that the requirements of the present CP have been met.

An updated CA report must be submitted annually to the National IT and Telecom and Agency. This must be made no later than three months after the end of the CA's financial year. The timeframe of the report must follow the CA's financial year.

## **5.5 CA report**

The report must include:

- the CA's CPS;
- the auditor's records;
- a declaration from the CA's management as to whether the CA's data, system and operating security as a whole is considered to be adequate, and that the CA complies with its own CPS;
- a declaration from the system auditor as to whether the CA's data, system and operating security as a whole is considered to be secure, and whether the CA complies with its own CPS; and
- documentation of indemnity insurance covering the CA's liability.

## **5.6 System audit**

System audits must be performed at the CA. System audits include auditing of:

- general IT controls in the company;
- IT-based user systems etc. for generating keys and key components and for registration, issue, verification, storage and revocation of certificates; and
- IT systems for exchanging data with other parties.

### **Appointing the system auditor - auditor's powers and obligations**

The CA must appoint an external state-authorised auditor to perform the system audit of the CA. In special cases, the National IT and Telecom Agency may exempt from the requirement that the system auditor must be a state-authorised auditor. Within one month after the appointment of the system auditor, the CA must notify this to the National IT and Telecom Agency.

The CA must disclose the information necessary to perform the system audit of the CA. The CA must give the appointed system auditor access to the management protocol.

The CA must give the appointed system auditor access to management meetings discussing matters relevant to the system audit. A management meeting means a meeting of the CA's top management, in practice often a board meeting. In this connection, "CA's management" means the top management of the CA, i.e. the board or a similar management body, depending on how the CA is organised. If any one board member so requires, the CA must ensure that the appointed systems auditor takes part in the management's discussion of matters relevant to the systems audit.

In CAs where general meetings are held, the provisions of the Danish Financial Statements Act on the auditor's obligation to reply to questions posed at a company's general meeting shall also apply to the appointed system auditor.

The CA must inform the appointed system auditor that, in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, the auditor must perform the system audit mentioned below, including checks to ensure the following:



- that the CA's systems comply with the requirements of this CP;
- that the CA's security, control and auditing requirements are allowed for to a sufficient extent in the development, maintenance and operation of the CA's systems;
- that the CA's procedures, both computerised and manual, are adequate in terms of security and control, and that they comply with the CA certification practice statement (CPS).

The CA must ensure that a vulnerability assessment of the logging procedure is performed as part of the system audit.

The appointed system auditor may cooperate with the CA's internal auditing team if one exists.

To the extent that the appointed system auditor finds significant weaknesses or irregularities, the CA management must deal with the matter at the next management meeting.

The CA must inform the appointed system auditor that the auditor is under obligation to report the matter(s) to the National IT and Telecom Agency provided that the system auditor continues to find significant weaknesses or irregularities. In addition, the CA must inform the system auditor that, upon inquiry from the National IT and Telecom Agency, the auditor is obliged, without prior acceptance by the CA, to disclose matters relating to the CA that have or may have an impact on the CA's administration of the task of issuing OCES certificates. However, the system auditor is obliged to inform the CA about the inquiry.

The CA and the system auditor must inform the National IT and Telecom Agency without delay about matters of significant importance to the continued operation of the CA.

#### **Auditor's records**

The CA must inform the appointed system auditor that the auditor must keep separate auditor's records on a current basis, to be presented at every management meeting, and that any entry into the records must be signed by the CA management and the appointed system auditor. In addition, the CA must inform the system auditor that the contents of the records must be specified as indicated below.

The appointed system auditor's records must include a report of the system audit performed as well as its conclusions. Furthermore, any matter that has given rise to significant comment must be described. The records prepared by the appointed system auditor must also state whether the auditor has received all the information requested while performing the task.

At the end of the CA's fiscal year, the appointed system auditor must prepare a report to the CA management.

The report must include statements as to whether:

- the system audit has been performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards;
- the appointed system auditor meets the qualifications required by legislation;
- the appointed system auditor has received all information requested by the auditor;
- the specified system audit tasks have been performed in accordance with the requirements of this CP;
- the data, system and operating security as a whole is found to be adequate.

The National IT and Telecom Agency may direct the CA to appoint a new system auditor within a stipulated time limit in case the acting system auditor is found to be clearly unqualified to perform the auditor's duties.

In case of a change of auditors, the CA and the resigned systems auditor(s) must each provide the National IT and Telecom Agency with a statement.

**Expenses related to system audits**

The CA must bear all expenses incurred in connection with system audits, including system audits ordered by the National IT and Telecom Agency.

## **6 Obligations and liability**

### **6.1 CA obligations**

The CA must fulfil all requirements specified in section 7.

The CA is responsible for its subcontractors meeting the procedures and requirements of this certificate policy.

The CA must ensure that all aspects are attended to in connection with the following:

- distribution of root certificates;
- instructions on how to generate and store keys;
- issuance of OCES personal certificates to subscribers;
- revocation of OCES personal certificates on request;
- publication of revocation lists;
- informing subscribers about impending expiry of the validity period of certificates, including the option of renewing key pairs; and
- renewal of OCES personal certificates.

The CA must maintain a technical operating environment that meets the security requirements of this CP.

The CA must use a reliable time source in connection with CA-related activities.

The CA must prepare a CPS addressing all requirements in this CP. The CPS must comply with this CP.

The CA must submit to audit requirements, cf. section 5.6.

The registration authority (RA) may either be closely associated with the CA, or it may be an independent function. In all circumstances the CA is responsible for the RA meeting the specified requirements and obligations as if they applied to the CA itself.

The CA must ensure that the provisions of this CP are followed by the associated RA/RAs.

In addition, the CA must ensure that the RA:

- establishes web access for registration procedures (may be part of the CA's web service if the RA is an integral part of the CA);
- verifies the applicant's identity and details; and
- maintains a technical operating environment conforming to the requirements of this CP.

## 6.2 Subscriber obligations

The CA must enter into an agreement with the subscriber under which the subscriber undertakes to fulfil the following conditions:

- to give adequate and correct answers to all requests from the CA (or RA) for information during the application process;
- only to use the OCES certificate and the related private keys in accordance with the provisions of this CP;
- to take reasonable measures to ensure that the mechanisms securing the private key are protected against compromise, alteration, loss and unauthorised use;
- to keep the password secret so as to prevent its disclosure to others;
- to ensure, when receiving the OCES certificate, that the contents of it are in agreement with the real situation;
- to immediately request revocation and possible renewal of the OCES certificate if the contents of it are no longer in agreement with the real situation;
- to immediately change its password or revoke the certificate if it is suspected that the password has been compromised;
- to immediately stop using the certificate if it comes to the subscriber's knowledge that the CA has been compromised;
- the use of a different password - e.g. biometrics - must implement a security standard at least at the same level as the security of traditional passwords in this certificate policy.

In case the subscriber's key pair is generated and stored centrally at the CA, the CA must also enter into an agreement with the subscriber under which the subscriber undertakes to meet the following conditions:

- to choose/decide a password in conformity with the provisions of section 7.2.8;
- to use and keep OTP devices, user IDs and passwords as directed by the CA;
- to take reasonable measures to protect the OTP device so as to prevent access by others; and
- to immediately block the OTP device if it is suspected that the device has been compromised.

In case the subscriber's key pair is generated and stored at the subscriber, the CA must also enter into an agreement with the subscriber under which the subscriber undertakes to meet the following conditions:

- to generate the password and store and use the cryptographic module as directed by the CA;
- to protect the private key by storing it in a cryptographic module as directed by the CA;
- to protect the private key with a password in conformity with the provisions of section 7.3.1;

- to immediately revoke the certificate if it is suspected that the password and the cryptographic module have been compromised; and
- to immediately revoke the certificate if it is suspected that the cryptographic module has been compromised.

In case the subscriber's key pair is generated at the CA, but is sent to the subscriber in a cryptographic module and stored under the subscriber's control, the CA must also enter into an agreement with the subscriber under which the subscriber undertakes to meet the following conditions:

- to keep and use the cryptographic module and password as directed by the CA;
- to protect the private key with a password in conformity with the provisions of section 7.2.8;
- to immediately revoke the certificate if it is suspected that the password and the cryptographic module have been compromised; and
- to immediately revoke the certificate if it is suspected that the cryptographic module has been compromised.

### **6.3 Information for verifiers (relying parties)**

Via its website and other means, the CA must inform verifiers about terms and conditions for using digital signatures, including that in order to rely on a certificate, the verifier must ensure:

- that a certificate received is valid and has not been revoked, i.e. it is not included in the CA's revocation list;
- that the purpose for which the certificate is to be used is appropriate in relation to any usage limitation in the OCES certificate; and
- that the use of the certificate is appropriate in other respects in relation to the level of security described in this CP.

### **6.4 Liability**

In relation to any person who reasonably relies on the certificate, the CA must assume liability for damages under the general rules of Danish law.

In addition, the CA must assume liability for damages for loss incurred by subscribers and verifiers who have reasonably relied on the certificate, provided that the loss is due to the following:

- that the information specified in the certificate was not correct at the time of issuing the certificate;
- that the certificate does not contain all information required under section 7.3.3;
- failure to revoke the certificate, cf. section 7.3.6;
- lacking or erroneous information about the revocation of the certificate, the expiry date of the certificate, or whether the certificate contains any limitations on scope or amounts, cf. sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.6; or
- failure to comply with section 7.3.1;

unless the CA can prove that the CA has not acted negligently or intentionally.

The CA shall prepare its own agreements etc. with joint contracting parties. The CA is entitled to seek limitation of its liability in the relationship between the CA and its joint contracting parties to the extent that such parties are business operators or public authorities. Thus the CA is not entitled to seek limitation of its liability in relation to private citizens who are joint contracting parties.

In addition, the CA is entitled to disclaim liability in relation to joint contracting parties who are business operators and public authorities for loss of the nature described in section 11(3) of Act No. 417 of 31 May 2000.

***Insurance***

The CA must take out and maintain an insurance to cover any claims for damages against the CA and RA by all joint contracting parties (subscribers and verifiers, relying parties) as well as the National IT and Telecom Agency. The minimum annual coverage must be DKK 10 million.

## 7 Requirements on CA practice

### 7.1 Certification practice statement (CPS)

The CA must prepare a certification practice statement (CPS) containing a detailed description of how the requirements of this CP are met, including:

- the CA's administrative and management procedures;
- qualifications, experience etc. of CA staff;
- the systems, products and algorithms used by the CA;
- the CA's security measures and related work process, including information about measures applicable with regard to maintaining and protecting the certificates as long as they exist;
- CA procedures regarding registration (identity control), issue of certificates, catalogue and revocation services, and registration and storage of information regarding certificates, including identity information;
- the CA's financial resources;
- CA procedures for entering into agreements about the issue of certificates and its notification duty; and
- to the extent that the CA has outsourced CA tasks to other companies or authorities, the CPS must also include the performance of such tasks; and
- what reliable time source the CA is using.

CA practices must always comply with the conditions specified in the CPS.

The CA must publish the CPS on its website. Sensitive information, e.g. trade secrets, can be exempted from publication.

### 7.2 Key management

The CA's key management must be in accordance with ETSI SR 002 176 v 1.1.1 (2003-03): "*Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures*", defining a list of recognised cryptographic algorithms and their parameter requirements.

For critical parts of the CA infrastructure, the CA must follow relevant and official recommendations from NIST regarding the use of up-to-date algorithms and key lengths.

#### 7.2.1 CA key generation

The CA must ensure that generation of keys is performed under controlled conditions. The conditions below must be observed in particular:

CA root keys and other private keys must be generated under the surveillance of two persons each holding a trusted position at the CA.

CA private keys must be generated in a cryptographic module that meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 3, CWA 14167-3, or higher. The cryptographic module must be stored in accordance with the requirements in 7.4.4.

If CA root keys or other private keys are to be transferred from the cryptographic module, this must be made in an encrypted form and in cooperation by at least two persons holding different trusted positions at the CA.

The certificate issuer's root keys must be RSA keys with a length of at least 2048 bit or similar. The certificate issuer's root keys must be valid for at least five years.

The "OCES" designation must form part of the root certificate's commonName.

### **7.2.2 CA key storage, backup and recovery**

The CA must ensure that CA root keys are not compromised and maintain their integrity at all times.

CA root keys and other private keys must be stored and used in cryptographic modules that comply with the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 3, CWA 14167-3, or higher.

Storage, backup and transport of CA root keys and other security critical private keys must be made under the surveillance of two persons each holding a trusted position at the CA.

Backup copies of the CA private keys must be stored in a cryptographic module that meets the requirements of FIPS 140-2 level 3, CWA 14167-3, or higher. The cryptographic module must be stored in accordance with the requirements in 7.4.4.

### **7.2.3 CA public key distribution**

The CA root certificate must be made available to verifiers (relying parties) via the CA's website in a way that ensures the integrity of the public key and authenticates its origin.

The CA must enable verification of the root certificate via a different channel. Verification can be made for instance by using a fingerprint of the certificate.

### **7.2.4 Key escrow**

The CA must not hold the subscriber's keys in escrow.

### **7.2.5 CA key usage**

The CA must ensure that the CA private keys are not being used for purposes other than signing certificates and providing status information about certificates.

The CA must ensure that certificate signing keys are only used within physically secure premises in accordance with 7.4.4.

### **7.2.6 End of CA key lifecycle**

The CA's private key must have a specified period of validity. After expiry, the private key must either be destroyed or kept in such a manner that it cannot be restored and be put to use again.



Before the private key expires, the CA must ensure generation of a new CA key pair that can be used for issuing OCES certificates.

#### **7.2.7 Management of cryptographic modules**

The CA must manage and store cryptographic modules in accordance with the requirements in 7.4 throughout the lifecycle of the cryptographic modules.

The CA must ensure that cryptographic modules for certificate and status information signing have not been compromised prior to installation.

The CA must ensure that cryptographic modules for certificate and status information signing are not compromised during use.

The CA must ensure that all management of cryptographic modules for certificate and status information signing is performed in cooperation by at least two persons each holding a trusted position at the CA.

The CA must ensure that cryptographic modules for certificate and status information signing are always functioning correctly.

The CA must ensure that keys stored in a cryptographic module for certificate and status information signing are destroyed upon module retirement.

#### **7.2.8 CA provided key management**

The CA must ensure that CA generated subscriber keys are generated securely, and that the secrecy of the subscriber's private keys is assured.

CA generated subscriber keys must be RSA keys with a minimum length of 2048 bit or similar.

In case the subscriber's key pair, after having been generated, is stored centrally at the CA, the following conditions must be met:

- It must not be possible to use the subscriber's private key without the subscriber having authorised such use in each individual case, thus ensuring that the subscriber will maintain sole control over its private key.
- The CA must protect access to the subscriber's private key using authentication of the subscriber by means of two independent factors in the form of an OTP device and a password.
- The password must be selected from an outcome space of at least  $36^6$  possible codes, for instance as 6 characters selected from 36 letters, figures and special characters. OTP response code must be selected from an outcome space of at least  $10^4$  codes, for instance as 4 numeric digits. Validation of the passwords must be implemented in a way that protects effectively against exhaustive searches. The use of a different password - e.g. biometrics - must implement a security standard at least at the same level as these requirements.
- The private key must be available to the subscriber after revocation to enable the subscriber to decrypt data using the private key.

In case the subscriber's key pair, after being generated by the CA, is sent to the subscriber in a cryptographic module and stored under the subscriber's control, the following conditions must be met:

- CA generated keys must be generated and stored securely before delivery to the subscriber.
- The subscriber's keys and the associated activation password must be delivered separately and in such a way that the confidentiality of these is not compromised.
- Generation and distribution of the subscriber's keys must be arranged in such a manner that only the subscriber itself will have access to the private key.
- The password must be selected from an outcome space of at least  $10^4$  possible codes, for instance as 4 digits selected from figures between 0 and 9. Validation of the passwords must be implemented in a way that protects effectively against exhaustive searches. The use of a different password - e.g. biometrics - must implement a security standard at least at the same level as these requirements.

### **7.3 Certificate management**

#### ***7.3.1 Subscriber registration***

Prior to the issue of an OCES personal certificate, the CA must ensure that the subscriber is made aware of and accepts the terms and conditions for using the certificate.

#### ***Verification of the applicant's identity***

The CA must establish a procedure for verification of the applicant's identity ensuring that the applicant has been identified at the level of the Act on Measures to Prevent Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.

The applicant's identity can be verified on the basis of personal appearance before an RA by presenting reliable identification.

The applicant's identity can also be verified without personal appearance on the basis of information that documents the applicant's identity in a similar reliable manner.

For verification of the applicant's identity, the procedure must ensure the following:

- The applicant's civil registration number is registered.
- The applicant's name and national register address are obtained via online lookup in the Civil Registration System as part of the application process;
- The applicant gives information documenting that the applicant is in possession of reliable identification that has involved personal appearance.
- The CA registers what reliable identification the issuance is based on.

- The applicant is provided with an activation password to register an OTP device or to generate OCES keys on a cryptographic module. The activation password and, where applicable, the OTP device are sent separately via secure means to the national register address or are delivered by the applicant appearing in person, subject to presentation of reliable identification.

A list of reliable identification documents as defined by the National IT and Telecom Agency from time to time is published on [www.digitalsignatur.dk](http://www.digitalsignatur.dk) in association with this CP.

In the event that the CA is already familiar with the subscriber's identity or applies other secure procedures for carrying out identity checks, the above-mentioned procedure for certificate application may be departed from in full or in part. Procedures must be submitted to the National IT and Telecom Agency for approval before implementation.

#### ***Issuing certificates and generating subscriber keys***

When issuing a certificate with associated keys, the CA must establish a procedure ensuring that:

- the subscriber has been authenticated in a secure manner by the CA, see above, before generation of the subscriber's private key;
- subscriber keys are RSA keys with a minimum length of 2048 bit or similar;
- the public key is transferred to the CA together with information about the subscriber's identity in a message signed with the private key;
- the private key is protected by a cryptographic module which is protected against exhaustive searching;
- the private key can only be activated by using two independent factors in the form of a physical unit held by the subscriber and a personal password only known to the subscriber;
- the personal password must be selected from an outcome space of at least  $10^4$  possible codes, for instance as 4 digits selected from figures between 0 and 9; The use of a different password - e.g. biometrics - must implement a security standard at least at the same level as these requirements; and
- the time and date of issuing the certificate can subsequently be determined.

The CA must indicate to the subscriber cryptographic modules that meet the relevant standards.

The RA must approve a certificate application if the procedure is completed as indicated.

The CA must ensure that from the time when an RA has received a certificate application and until information required for issuing a certificate has been sent to the certificate applicant, no more than one working day will pass on average within a running month. The time is never allowed to exceed three working days.

### 7.3.2 *Certificate renewal*

Renewal of an OCES certificate means using a valid certificate for issuing a new certificate according to this certificate policy to the same subscriber, with a new key pair, new validity period, a new certificate serial number, and the current OID. An OCES certificate may be renewed for up to four years at a time.

The CA must ensure that a request for and issue of a renewed OCES certificate can be made online.

The CA must ensure that the request for renewal is signed using the subscriber's private key.

The CA must accept proof of holding the private key belonging to the existing certificate as being adequate authentication in cases where a certificate is to be renewed. In case of certificate renewal, the RA must thus ensure that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the public key in the existing valid certificate presented in the certificate application.

The certificate application and issue must also meet the requirements in section 7.3.1 for issuing certificates and generating and installing the subscriber's keys.

After revocation or expiry, or if the private key has been compromised, a certificate cannot be renewed. In such cases, the CA must ensure that a new certificate can be issued with a new key, and that the request for a new OCES certificate is then handled like a new issue following the same guidelines as given in 7.3.1.

No later than 4 weeks before expiry, the CA must notify the subscriber of this via e-mail sent to the e-mail address registered by the CA or via ordinary mail to the national register address.

### 7.3.3 *Certificate generation*

OCES personal certificates must follow DS 844: Specification for qualified certificates ("*Specifikation for kvalificerede certifikater*"), except that QcStatements must not state that the certificate is a qualified certificate.

<b><i>OCES personal certificates must include:</i></b>	<b><i>Solution</i></b>
Identification of the issuing CA and the country in which the certification authority is established	Issuer information contains the required information, i.e. as a minimum an unambiguous name and country code.
Subscriber name or a pseudonym; in the latter case it must appear that a pseudonym is used	CommonName contains name and/or pseudonym. If a pseudonym is used, the pseudonym is also placed in the Pseudonym field.
Specific information about the subscriber may be added, if relevant, depending on the purpose of the certificate	Subject serialNumber and other attributes contain information with suitable qualifiers. See further details in ETSI TS 101 862 and RFC 3039.

<b><i>OCES personal certificates must include:</i></b>	<b><i>Solution</i></b>
	The Subject SerialNumber format must follow the specifications for personal certificates in DS 844, section 4.3.
Signature verifying data corresponding to the signature generating data under the signer's control	X.509.v3.
Certificate commencement and expiry dates	X.509.v3 and RFC 3280.
Certificate identification code	The CA assigns the certificate a unique CA serial number. Together with the CA's identification, the number is completely unique. X.509.v3 and RFC 3280.
The issuing CA's advanced electronic signature	X.509.v3 and RFC 3280.
Limitations on the scope of use of the certificate, if applicable	KeyUsage, CertificatePolicies and ExtendedKeyUsage.

### **The Subject certificate field**

In the "Requirements" column, M stands for Mandatory and O for Optional.

<b>Attribute</b>	<b>Requirements</b>	<b>Comment</b>
countryName	M	Country code
organizationName	O	"No organisational affiliation"
organizationalUnitName	M	See rules below
serialNumber	M	Qualifier PID: Concatenated with serial number. See DS 843-1. Person-specific Identification Numbers (PID)
givenName	O	The person's first name
surname	O	The person's surname
commonName	M	The person's full name or pseudonym. See rules below
postalAddress	O	The person's national register address
emailAddress	O	The person's e-mail account
pseudonym	O	The person's pseudonym

Example:

countryName=DK,  
 serialNumber= PID:9208-2001-3-279815395,  
 commonName= Test Tester  
 emailAddress=tester@validdnsdomain.dk

organisationName="No organisational affiliation"

**Rules:**

**countryName=DK, serialNumber, givenName, surName, commonName** and **pseudonym** must collectively and unambiguously point to the person who is the subscriber of the certificate.

**OrganizationName:** If this field is used, its contents must be set to "No organisational affiliation".

**SerialNumber:** Used for unique identification (see: Person-specific Identification Numbers ("*Personspecifikke Identifikationsnumre*"): DS 843-1).

**Pseudonym:** Must not be used if **givenName** or **surName** is used.

If the OCES certificate contains a pseudonym in **commonName**, the pseudonym must also be specified in **pseudonym**.

**OrganizationalUnitName:** If, at the time of issue, the person is under the age of 18, but over the age of 15, the following must be stated: "Young person aged 15 to 18 - In general not allowed to enter into legally binding agreements". If, at the time of issue, the person is under the age of 15, the following must be added: "Young person under the age of 15 - Cannot enter into legally binding agreements."

**CommonName:** If, at the time of issue, the person is under the age of 18, the following must be added: "(Young person under the age of 18)"

Fields not mentioned are optional.

**Other fields (extensions)**

The version number must be "v3".

In case of a certificate which can be used for signing, authentication and encryption, the **keyUsage** extension must be set with the following specifications:

**digitalSignature (0)**  
**contentCommitment (1)**  
**keyEnchipherment (2)**  
**dataEncipherment (3)**  
**keyAgreement (4)**

The following specifications must be set for certificates used for authentication and signature:

**digitalSignature (0)**  
**contentCommitment (1)**

The contentCommitment specification is set to inform recipients of certificates that the signature is binding on the subscriber in relation to the signed content.

The following specifications must be set for certificates used for encryption only:

**keyEnchipherment (2)**  
**dataEncipherment (3)**  
**keyAgreement (4)**

In all cases, this extension must be defined as critical.

The following codes are used in the tables below:

- O: Optional
- C: The extension must be marked as "Critical".
- X: The extension must not be marked as "Critical".
- (C): Optional for the CA to mark the extension as "Critical".
- R: The extension is "Required".
- M: The extension must be addressed ("Mandatory").
- : The extension has no meaning.

Extension	1. Application	Generation		
		Signature		4. Key Man.
		2. CA	3. End-user	
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	O	O	O	O
SubjectKeyIdentifier	O	O	O	O
KeyUsage	CM	CMR	CMR	CMR
ExtendedKeyUsage	O	O	O	O
PrivateKeyUsagePeriod	O	O	O	O
CertificatePolicies	M	(C)MR	(C)MR	(C)MR
PolicyMappings	O	O	-	-
SubjectAltName	O	O	O	O
IssuerAltName	O	O	O	O
SubjectDirectoryAttributes	O	O	O	O
BasicConstraints	M	CMR	O	O
NameConstraints	O	O	-	-
PolicyConstraints	O	O	-	-
CRLDistributionPoints	M	R	R	R
QcStatements	O	O	O	O

Comments to the table:

Extension management is divided into four columns:

1. Software using certificates issued.
2. Generation of certificates for CA software.
3. Generation of certificates to the end-user to be used for electronic signatures.
4. Generation of certificates to the end-user to be used for management/exchange of keys, e.g. in connection with the authentication/control of access rights.

**CertificatePolicies** must at least specify the relevant object identifiers for this CP.

### 7.3.4 Dissemination of terms and conditions

The CA must publish terms and conditions on its website for using certificates issued under this CP.

The CA must inform the subscriber that OCES personal certificates cannot be used to sign other certificates.

The CA must inform the subscriber that the private key must not be used until the OCES certificate has been received by the subscriber, apart from the use made during the certificate application process.

The CA must inform the subscriber that the private key must not be used for signing after a request for revocation, notification of revocation, or after expiry.

In addition, the CA must inform the subscriber that if the subscriber suspects that the private key has been compromised, the key must only be used for making a request for revocation. In case the private key is available to the subscriber, the private key may still be used for decrypting data which was encrypted using the associated public key.

When issuing new keys and renewing existing keys, the CA must inform the subscriber that data encrypted with a public key can only be decrypted using the associated private key.

The CA must inform the subscriber about the validity period of an OCES personal certificate and that an OCES personal certificate may be renewed if this is done before the certificate expires.

### ***7.3.5 Certificate dissemination***

The CA must make the following types of information available to all:

- The root certificate used for issuing certificates under this CP.
- The CA must enable verification of the fingerprint of the root certificate via a different channel.
- Other certificates used for signing information between the CA, subscribers and verifiers (relying parties).
- This CP, as long as valid certificates issued under this CP exist, and as long as there are certificates on the revocation list of this CP.
- The CPS approved by the system auditor, except for specific trade secrets.
- List of all OCES personal certificates until at least two months after expiry of the validity period of the individual certificate. Excepted from this are the certificates to be kept secret.
- A revocation list for OCES personal certificates issued under this CP.

Revocation list information must be available without any kind of access control.

The CA must ensure that CA requirements imposed on the subscriber and verifier (relying party) on the basis of this CP are summarised and documented, cf. sections 6.2 and 6.3.

### ***7.3.6 Certificate revocation***

#### ***Revocation of certificates, general***



The CA must revoke an OCES certificate immediately if the CA becomes aware of one or more of the following conditions:

- The subscriber wants to revoke the OCES certificate or terminate the use of this.
- There is certainty or suspicion that the subscriber's private key has been compromised.
- The private key has been destroyed or lost in a different manner.
- Inaccuracy has been found in the content of the certificate or other information associated with the subscriber, see also below regarding the subscriber's change of name.
- The subscriber has passed away.

If the subscriber changes its name, the CA must immediately notify the subscriber that the certificate is to be renewed within 30 days. If this is not made, the CA must revoke the certificate.

The CA may revoke a certificate if the CA becomes aware that:

- the rules in this CP have not been met by the subscriber; or
- the provisions of the agreement between the CA and the subscriber have been violated.

The CA's own violation of this CP shall not give the CA the right to revoke a certificate.

In case of a request for revocation, the CA must ensure that identification is made in a way that establishes the identity in the best possible manner, e.g. by a combination of name, national register address and e-mail address.

A request for revocation can be made by the following:

- the subscriber;
- the CA, if the rules of this CP have not been complied with, or where warranted by the circumstances;
- an administrator appointed by the probate court or heirs of the subscriber, in case the subscriber has passed away; and
- a guardian upon presenting proper documentation.

To the extent possible, the CA must ensure that the procedure for requesting revocation will not allow unauthorised revocation, while at the same time accepting authorised revocation by telephone, e-mail or online via the CA's website.

### ***Requests for revocation***

In case revocation is requested by telephone, the CA must ensure that the necessary information is submitted to ensure proper identification and that the reason for the requested revocation is stated.

Requests for revocation via online web forms or e-mail must contain the necessary information to ensure identification or be signed with the certificate desired to be revoked.

***Further aspects regarding revocation***

In connection with requests for revocation, the CA must provide information about any revocation undertaken, using signed e-mail or via ordinary mail sent to the official postal address as indicated in the Civil Registration System if this is available to the CA. If this is not the case, the information must be sent to the postal address registered by the CA.

No matter which channel the subscriber chooses for revocation, the subscriber always has a right to be informed via ordinary mail if this is available to the CA.

If the CA revokes the certificate without having been requested to do so, the CA must send a notification stating the reason for revocation via signed e-mail to the subscriber and by ordinary mail to the official postal address as indicated in the Civil Registration System if this is available to the CA.

If revocation is made on the basis of a request from the probate court or liquidator, the CA must send a revocation acknowledgement to the postal address stated by the probate court or liquidator respectively.

Where a condition giving rise to revocation has been ascertained, the CA must ensure that revocation is made without undue delay.

An OCES personal certificate cannot be suspended.

***Management of revocation lists***

The CA must ensure that revocation is made immediately after reception of a request and, where relevant, confirmation of the requesting party's identity.

After a completed revocation, the CA must publish an updated revocation list. This must take place no later than 1 minute after revocation.

The CA must ensure that there is a separate revocation list for OCES certificates.

The CA must set the lifetime of the revocation list at 12 hours. The CA must publish a new revocation list each time a revocation is made, but no later than 6 hours before expiry of the current revocation list.

The CA must make revocation lists available for downloading via the following channels:

- LDAP
- HTTP

In addition, the CA must make revocation list information available via manual online lookup.

For revocation lists the CA must use a profile as stated in IETF RFC 3280. **thisUpdate** and **nextUpdate** must be stated in **UTCTime** format YYMMDDHHMMSSz.

The version number of the revocation list must be stated and set at "v2". There is no requirement to use CRL extensions.

A CA may also offer online status checks (e.g. via Online Certificate Status Protocol, OCSP).

For OCSP the CA must use a profile in accordance with IETF RFC 5019.

The OCSP response may be pregenerated, but it is required that if a certificate is revoked, then the associated OCSP response must be regenerated, and no later than 1 minute after the revocation has been registered the OCSP response must indicate that the certificate has been revoked.

OCSP responders must be provided with dedicated company certificates used exclusively for OCSP. Besides the formalities required for a company signature, the following requirements must be met by the contents:

- Key Usage: Digital Signature
- Extended Key Usage: OCSP Signing
- CRL Distribution Point: Not included
- AIA: Not included
- OCSP No Check: Included but empty

The lifetime of OCSP responder certificates must be 72 hours as a maximum, and the associated keys must be protected by cryptographic modules in line with other CA keys, as indicated in section 7.2.1.

The CA must make sure that revocation lists are not compromised, and that the revocation lists and OCSP services are available via the Internet 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The services must have an average response time not exceeding 1 second measured at the server entry, i.e. from the time when the server has registered the request until it returns a response.

## **7.4 CA management and operation**

The requirements in section 7.4 solely address the RA where this is explicitly mentioned.

### **7.4.1 Security management**

The CA must ensure that its administrative and management procedures are adequate and conform to the basic requirements of Danish Standards' "Code of practice for information security management DS 484".

To the extent that the CA estimates that the special conditions regarding CA operation justify requirements for stricter security measures, i.e. compliance with stricter requirements as described in DS 484, these must be applied. In the annual CA report the CA must describe what requirements on stricter security measures have been implemented.

The CA must assume full responsibility for all services made available, directly or indirectly, for managing certificate issue and status information.

The CA must ensure that persons with auditing functions at the CA do not report to the same managers as operations officers and administrators.

#### ***7.4.2 Asset identification and classification***

The CA must meet the basic and stricter requirements of DS 484 in accordance with the provisions of section 7.4.1.

#### ***7.4.3 Personnel security***

##### ***Security classification procedures***

The CA must check that managers and employees performing trusted assignments at or for the CA have not been convicted of a crime that makes them unsuitable for performing their job. This also applies to RA employees.

##### ***Check of subcontractors***

The CA must make sure that subcontractors' personnel meet the same requirements for education, experience and security classification as the CA's own employees in the functions performed by the subcontractors' personnel for the CA.

By means of access procedures, the CA must ensure that subcontractors' personnel cannot work without surveillance at the CA.

RA personnel must receive training that will enable them to perform their work correctly and securely.

#### ***7.4.4 Physical security***

##### ***General***

The CA must clearly identify the localities at which employees and data centres related to CA activities are located. Facilities housing key generation systems are designated CA operation facilities.

All facilities used for employees at the CA must be defined as special security areas in accordance with DS 484.

##### ***CA operation facilities***

CA operation facilities must be physically separate from other CA facilities.

In case of evacuation, the CA operation facilities must be capable of functioning via remote control without changes in operation. By remote control is understood the possibility of operating CA functions via a PC etc. from a facility physically separate from CA operations, e.g. where the CA has established a backup system.

### ***Physical access***

#### ***General***

The CA must ensure that all facilities have perimeter protection conforming to DS 471 or better.

The CA must ensure that watch is kept 24 hours a day.

#### ***CA operation facilities***

The CA must ensure that access to and stays in the central operation facilities are monitored on video.

### ***Storage and processing of data in other localities***

If data is stored or processed at a different locality, the CA must ensure that this is subject to compliance with the same security requirements as those applying to the main system.

#### ***7.4.5 Management of the operation of IT systems and networks***

The CA must meet the basic and stricter requirements of DS 484 in accordance with the provisions of section 7.4.1.

#### ***7.4.6 Management of access to systems, data and networks***

The CA must meet the basic and stricter requirements of DS 484 in accordance with the provisions of section 7.4.1.

The CA must make RA systems available ensuring that only authorised RA personnel have access to operate such systems.

#### ***7.4.7 Development, procurement and maintenance of IT systems***

The CA must use recognised systems and products that are protected against alteration. The products must comply with an adequate protection profile in accordance with ISO/IEC 15408 or similar.

Prior to any system development (i.e. internal development or development by a third party), the CA must ensure that there is a management approved plan for integration of security in the systems.

#### ***7.4.8 Emergency preparedness planning***

The following incidents must be considered serious:

- Compromise of the CA private key.
- Suspicion of compromise of the CA private key.

- Breakdown and critical errors on CA operating components (revocation lists etc.).
- Stoppage of the CA operating environment due to fire, power failure etc.

If the CA private key has been compromised, or if this is suspected, the CA must immediately inform all subscribers via the registered e-mail address. The CA must also inform the National IT and Telecom Agency immediately, with a detailed description of the situation that has arisen.

The CA must also inform verifiers (relying parties) immediately on its website, and to the extent found relevant in view of the situation arisen, via public media or by direct contact.

In case of serious incidents on data processing equipment, software and/or data, the CA must inform subscribers thereof to the extent that it is relevant to their use of the CA services. In view of the situation arisen, the verifiers (relying parties) must be informed via public media and announcements in the daily press.

The CA must ensure that all procedures relating to revocation lists, including requests for revocation, are given the highest priority in connection with re-establishing business procedures after a breakdown.

#### ***7.4.9 CA termination***

The CA must ensure that all issuing and renewal of certificates are stopped immediately when a CA function ceases to operate.

Prior to termination, the CA must inform subscribers and all other parties that have contractual relations to the CA.

The CA must ensure the continued maintenance of revocation lists and requests for revocation until all certificates issued by this CA have expired or have been transferred to another CA that meets the requirements of this CP.

The CA must ensure that archives are accessible for a minimum of six years after expiry of the last certificate issued by this CA.

#### ***7.4.10 Compliance with legislation***

The CA and RA must ensure compliance with legal requirements, in particular the Act on Processing of Personal Data.

#### ***Special obligations regarding the protection of confidential information***

Information not included in certificates and revocation lists is considered confidential.

Information included in certificates is considered non-confidential and non-private.

Person-related information not included in the certificate is considered private information.

The CA must ensure that it is possible for a subscriber to require that name and address information, including e-mail addresses, does not appear from the certificate (*only applicable to personal certificates*).

The CA and RA must ensure that confidential information is protected from being compromised and must not use confidential information for any purpose other than what is required for operating the CA.

The CA and RA must ensure that private information is protected from being compromised and must not use private information for any purpose other than what is required for operating the CA.

The CA and RA must ensure that statistical information about the use of OCES personal certificates cannot be related to the individual OCES certificate.

If a dispute cannot be settled by conciliation, either of the parties may choose to bring the dispute before the ordinary courts. The venue is Copenhagen. The applicable law is Danish law.

#### ***7.4.11 Recording of certificate information***

The CA is responsible for establishing a data storage system which must contain all data necessary for the secure operation of the CA in accordance with this CP. In addition, the CA must ensure that:

- all information is protected against unauthorised access;
- all activities requiring participation of more than one person are logged;
- all information about registration, including certificate renewals, is logged;
- all accesses and access attempts to areas that must be protected by access control are logged;
- all video monitoring is logged;
- there are written rules for regular review of all logs;
- all audit logs are signed electronically and are time stamped;
- audit logs are treated as confidential material; and
- audit logs are backed up at regular intervals.

The CA must ensure that backup data is stored in accordance with the requirements of DS 484.

The CA must ensure that the National IT and Telecom Agency is informed of significant irregularities in the logging procedure and notified once annually in all other cases.

The CA must ensure that the following information is archived:

- all logs;
- certificate applications and associated communication;
- signed orders and written agreements;
- certificate renewals; and
- CPS and CP.

The CA must ensure that archived information can be made available in case of disputes, and that all archived material is kept for at least the current calendar year + five years. This also applies to any data from the RA's IT systems relevant to documenting the CA's activities.

The CA and RA must ensure that all material in archives is stored in accordance with the requirements of DS 484.

The CA and RA must ensure that backup copies are made of all electronic archive material at regular intervals.

The CA and RA must ensure that all electronic archive material is provided with an electronic time stamp at the time of archiving. Other archive material must be entered in a log.

### **7.5 Organisational aspects**

The CA organisation must be reliable.

The CA must be a registered natural or legal person.

The CA must ensure equal access to all services within the scope of the OCES personal certificates. This means that terms and conditions for access to services must be non-discriminatory.

All CA administrative and business procedures must be adapted to the security level necessary for operating a CA.

The CA must have sufficient financial strength to cover the liability assumed as a CA, including the obligations in 7.4.9, partly through insurance, and partly through equity capital.

The CA must at all times have at its disposal a sufficient number of trained personnel for operating, in an adequate manner, all services provided. The staff must at all times possess the skills prescribed by the definition of each trusted position.

The CA must ensure that policies and procedures are in place for handling customer inquiries or inquiries from verifiers.

The CA must ensure that written agreements are in place with all CA service subcontractors.

### **7.6 Data centre location**

The requirements of this CP are applicable no matter whether the CA places all or parts of the operating environment abroad. Thus it must be possible to perform the ongoing check prescribed in the CP irrespective of the CA's geographic location.



If a state-authorized public accountant does not perform the systems audit, an exemption from the National IT and Telecom Agency is required, cf. section 7.1.