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# **OIO Web SSO Profile V2.1.0**

(also known as OIOSAML 2.1.0)

## ***Revised edition***

*Includes errata and minor clarifications*

Agency for Digitisation

December 2020

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## Document History

Version	Date	Initials	Changes
2.0	17.08.07	SPN	Document history reset as document is ready for public hearing
2.0.1	31.10.07	TG	<p>Updated with feedback from public hearing and expert reviews:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identifiers in some examples have been changed to avoid conflict with real domains.</li> <li>• Signing rules have been changed so Assertions must be signed while responses to authentication requests should not be signed (to avoid double-signatures).</li> <li>• It has been clarified that only certificates, which are part of the SAML meta data, may be used (i.e. no out-of-band certificates).</li> <li>• It is now stated explicitly that a signed &lt;AuthnRequest&gt; going over HTTP Redirect binding will hold the signature in the 'Signature' query string parameter defined for this binding.</li> <li>• Requirements have been added stating that Service Providers must be able to handle mandatory attributes with empty values. Empty, optional attributes should not occur.</li> <li>• It has been clarified that additional signatures can be ignored and that implementations must not halt on these.</li> <li>• Service Providers MUST not halt if a special attribute is included in an attribute statement specifying a Liberty Discovery Service Endpoint Reference. It is, however, acceptable to ignore the attribute if it is not understood by the recipient.</li> <li>• Security requirements for the Single Logout profile have been clarified.</li> <li>• Description of which type(s) of certificates that are allowed for signing and encrypting can be different from federation to federation. Specific certificate requirements in connection with signing and encryption of messages have thus been removed from the profile. These requirements must be determined by federation policy.</li> <li>• Section on privacy and personal data has been rewritten.</li> <li>• Requirements for SOAP security have been replaced by transport level security requirements (two-way SSL / TLS).</li> </ul>

2.0.2	26.11.07	SPN	<p>Profile has been renamed from <i>SAML Profile for Federation in Danish Public Sector V2.0</i> to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>OIO Web SSO Profile V2.0</i></li> </ul>
2.0.3	28.11.07	SPN	<p>Added naming convention for Entity Identifier in chapter 11.</p> <p>Added description of potential future updates in chapter 13</p>
2.0.4	31.01.08	TG	<p>Added attribute for OCES youth certificates (chapter 8) and changed attribute name format identifier from “uri” to “basic” (in section 7.2) to increase support for the profile in COTS products.</p> <p>Replaced wrong drawing in figure 2 (Service Access with Single Sign-On).</p> <p>It has been clarified, that the IdP must honour the IsPassive and ForceAuthn attributes defined on the SAML &lt;AuthnRequest&gt; element.</p>
2.0.5	20.02.08	SPN	<p>Added minor text clarifications in various places.</p> <p>Clarified requirement about tolerating Liberty Discovery Service EPR Attribute (Optional)</p> <p>Removed the following statement from section about AuthnStatement Element: <i>When authenticating subjects using an OCES certificate, the &lt;AuthnContext&gt; element SHOULD refer to the following authentication context class in an &lt;AuthContextClassRef&gt; element: urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:X509.</i></p> <p>Context regarding strength of authentication is passed via the &lt;AssuranceLevel&gt; attribute</p>
2.0.6	03.09.08	TG	<p>The NotBefore attribute on the Conditions element has been allowed to be present but is not required to be processed by receivers.</p> <p>Requirements for &lt;NameIDMappingService&gt; and &lt;ManageNameIDMappingService&gt; in meta data have been removed as these services are no longer used by the profile.</p> <p>The Format qualifier is now explicitly allowed on the Issuer element. The NameQualifier and SPNameQualifier are allowed when using persistent pseudonyms.</p> <p>A name convention for representing OCES subjects as strings has been added to section 8.1.1.</p>
2.0.6	28.09.08	SPN	<p>To support consistent naming in the Danish standards portfolio the short name for this profile has been changed from DK-SAML 2.0 to OIOSAML 2.0.</p>
2.0.6	22.01.09	SPN	<p>Updated language in sections 1.3 and 7.4 concerning Sector-specific attributes to clarify that while Sector or IdP specific attributes must be made available via attribute query when other IdP’s are used as well, it is allowed to include the attributes in authentication assertions as well.</p> <p>Section 11.2 “Convention for naming Entity Identifier” has been amended with guidelines for naming Entity Identifiers when an organisation has multiple SAML installations within the same domain.</p> <p>Section 11.4.1 "Exchanging meta data" has been amended</p>

			<p>with information pulled from the OASIS standard that entities MAY publish their metadata documents at the location denoted by its unique identifier, which MUST be in the form of a URL</p> <p>Section 7.3.6 - Representation of Friendly Name has been added to example for Uid attribute</p>
2.0.7	05.03.2010	TG	<p>Updated based on input from technical community:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Includes reference to new profile with privileges.</li> <li>• Added new Issuer attribute to the OCES certificate profile.</li> <li>• SSL requirements for the single logout bindings have been clarified (only one-way SSL is required).</li> <li>• In section 7.2 it is clarified that mandatory attributes MUST be filled with empty values if the Identity Provider does not know their value.</li> <li>• Requirements for consent in section 10.8 have been clarified.</li> <li>• POST binding is now allowed for Single Logout. It is mandatory for Identity Providers but optional for Service Providers.</li> <li>• Added mechanisms for Service Provider to express the desired level of Assurance via parameters in the &lt;AuthnRequest&gt; message.</li> <li>• It is clarified that Service Providers are allowed to query the common domain cookie using central services when discovering Identity Providers.</li> <li>• Complex XML in attributes is no longer explicitly forbidden.</li> <li>• Added mechanisms for Service Providers to express which kind of OCES certificate that is desired for login.</li> <li>• Added requirement for proxy IdPs to state the real service provider in the &lt;AuthnRequest&gt; message.</li> </ul>
2.0.8	09.12.2011	TG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relaxed requirements for Service Providers to use common domain cookie to resolve IdP before sending authentication request. This is now only required if the SP supports more than one IdP.</li> <li>• Added three new optional attributes relevant for employees. They can hold information on affiliation with production units (P-enhded), tax unit (SE-enhded) and whether the employee is appointed user administrator in his company.</li> </ul>
2.0.9	18.09.2012	TG	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Removed usage of authentication context declarations in authentication requests (desired assurance level and desired certificate) since the constructs are non-SAML compliant and not used in practice.</li> <li>• Added requirements to declare nameid format in metadata for Service Providers (to select either OCES</li> </ul>

			<p>attribute profile or persistent pseudonym profile)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updated contact info (DIGST replacing NITA).</li> </ul>
2.1.0	29.10.2020	TG	<p>The following attributes are retired from the profile and will not be supported in the next major release of the NemLog-in IdP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UserCertificate(urn:oid:1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.8)</li> <li>• Certificate issuer (urn:oid:2.5.29.29)</li> <li>• (Certificate) serial number (urn:oid:2.5.4.5)</li> <li>• IsYouthCert (dk:gov:saml:attribute:IsYouthCert)</li> <li>• UniqueAccountKey (dk:gov:saml:attribute:UniqueAccountKey)</li> <li>• Postal address (urn:oid:2.5.4.16)</li> <li>• Title (urn:oid:2.5.4.12)</li> <li>• Organization unit (urn:oid:2.5.4.11)</li> <li>• UserAdministratorIndicator (dk:gov:saml:attribute:UserAdministratorIndicator)</li> </ul> <p>The above attributes are closely bound to OCES certificates which cannot in general be assumed to be held by identities when NemID is migrated to MitID.</p> <p>Note:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The OIOSAML 2.1.0 profile will be used for the legacy SAML IdP in NemLog-in3. This IdP serves both NemID and MitID authentications and aims to be as close as possible to the OIOSAML 2.0.9 profile to preserve compatibility with existing Service Providers while they migrate to the new OIOSAML 3.0 IdP.</li> <li>• The OIOSAML 3.0 profile will be used in the new SAML IdP in NemLog-in3 and also serves both NemID and MitID authentications in a modernized way based on NSIS. New Service Provider deployments are advised to use this profile.</li> <li>• The two IdPs will run in parallel for a period of time, but the legacy 2.1.0 IdP will be phased out after NemID is retired.</li> </ul>

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# 1 Introduction

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This chapter describes the purpose, structure, background, terminology, and prerequisites for the profile. Adherence to the profile is also briefly discussed.

## 1.1 Referenced documents

All referenced documents are listed in Appendix B. Each reference has an identifier in square bracket, like [SAMLCore]. Documents are referenced in the text using this identifier.

## 1.2 Summary of Requirements

The chapters 3 to 11 in this document contain normative requirements for the profile.

A brief summary of the requirements is available in a separate document named *OIO Web SSO Profile V2.0 - Requirements Summary* [OIOSAML-Summary].

However, this full profile document is still normative and will take precedence in case of any conflicts or ambiguities.

## 1.3 Purpose

This document contains a set of profiles of the OASIS SAML 2.0 standard for use within Danish public sector federations. It is named *OIO Web SSO profile V2.0* or in short *OIOSAML 2.0* since it profiles the OASIS SAML 2.0 standard<sup>1</sup>.

The SAML standard is an XML-based framework for describing and exchanging security information between on-line business partners. This security information is expressed in the form of portable SAML assertions that applications working across security domain boundaries can trust. The OASIS SAML standard defines precise syntax and rules for requesting, creating, communicating, and using these SAML assertions [SAMLTechOverv].

OIOSAML 2.0 replaces the previous version 1.1 of Danish SAML profiles; see appendix A for an overview of the changes. The profile contains several profiles described in this document covering Web Single Sign-On, attribute queries to an Attribute Service co-located with the Identity Provider, Single Logout and discovery of an Identity Provider. Other areas such as identity-based web services are out of scope for the profile but will be addressed later - see [CSI-Visioner] for an overview of future deliveries and milestones.

The profile aims at ensuring interoperability at a technical level but leaves (where possible) organizational questions, policies and business issues to the federations using the profile.

OIOSAML 2.0 should be regarded as a baseline for federations formed in the Danish Public Sector who may also include private companies. Adhering to OIOSAML 2.0 from the start will allow federations to merge faster and less costly than if having implemented very different means of integration. Also, even though this profile is

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<sup>1</sup> The profile is also known under the short name *DK-SAML 2.0*, which was brought over from the first version of the profile. However, to support consistent naming in the Danish standards portfolio this profile is now referred to as *OIOSAML 2.0*.



aimed for one federation, it will be a lot easier for a service provider to participate in several federations if they all adhere to this or a similar profile.

It should be noted, that OIOSAML 2.0 has been designed with flexibility in mind to e.g. allow individual sectors to define their own attribute profiles under OIOSAML. Thus, a delicate trade-off between interoperability and flexibility has been attempted.

The profiles contained in this document tailor the generic SAML framework to the needs of the Danish public sector by:

- Specifying which OASIS SAML profiles that must be supported.
- Limiting choices and complexity by narrowing the generally wide set of options allowed by SAML, for example regarding bindings.
- Taking the Danish OCES standard (and other Danish standards) for digital signatures into account.
- Dealing with scenarios required by portals such as the Danish Citizen Portal (borger.dk).
- Extending SAML with local requirements e.g. for stating the level of authentication in assertions and how to include sector-specific attributes.
- Including experience and best-practice from other countries including the American E-Authentication initiative and New Zealand's e-government programme.

The profile includes a set of sub-profiles that can be combined in different ways according to which scenarios that must be supported.

There are two types of sub-profiles

- Protocol profiles – describing the flow sequences between partners and necessary information exchanged in the flow – covering single sign on, single log out and attribute query.
- Attribute profiles – describing information about the user to be exchanged. This covers basic user information e.g. from authentication with user name & password, information related to user authentication with OCES Digital Signature as well as a more privacy friendly attribute profile where the only information being exchanged is a pseudonym.

In the future support for additional ways of authenticating (beyond user name/password and OCES Digital Signature) can be supported by adding additional attribute profiles. An example could be a so called "Citizens ID Card" that can supply more information than currently is available for OCES Digital Signature.

Also, certain sectors may want to exchange information about a user that is specific to their domain. In such a case, this profile accommodates that domain specific attribute profiles can be developed in a particular sector, and utilized through the attribute

query profile to support scenarios where users may be authenticated at a different Identity Provider than the one that holds domain specific information about the user.

#### **1.4 Background**

The National IT and Telecom Agency in Denmark (NITA)<sup>2</sup> (and later the Agency for Digitisation) has for several years worked on an initiative aiming for a common approach to authentication and user management for E-Government in Denmark. In the process, the initiative has adopted several elements from the E-Authentication initiative in USA (<http://www.cio.gov/eauthentication>). Experience from other countries' public sector federations has also been taken into account.

A requirement for the Danish initiative is to enable government Service Providers to use external authentication services instead of developing their own, Single Sign-On (SSO) across disparate systems and establish a foundation for federated identity management.

Other important goals are supporting innovative new public sector IT-solutions as well as cost-reductions through re-use of authentication services, faster development cycles for E-Government applications, consistent application of security technology, improved user experiences (via Single Sign-On) and reduced administration cost.

NITA produced a set of documents and published them for public hearing (ending September 2005). The base document [ITArch] defined the overall architecture and scenarios for Single Sign-On (SSO) to be supported. The architecture was based on the concept of federation and was technology-agnostic such that it could be implemented using different underlying technologies

Late 2005 the first versions of Danish SAML profiles (V1.0 and V1.1) were written. Both documents had status of drafts, pending real use validation in a Danish context. They were based on SAML 2.0 and the proposed architecture [ITArch] which contained some non-SAML constructs.

Based on development in the market and experience from actual deployments, a new profile has been developed. This profile has strongly reduced choices in integration with the aim of making integration simpler without sacrificing security. Also, almost all non-SAML constructs have been eliminated from the profile.

The mentioned experience from deployments in USA and other countries have brought the following facts to light:

- SAML 2.0 has increasingly been adopted by software vendors, and is now generally accepted as the de-facto Web SSO standard.
- The non-SAML components in the US E-Authentication Architecture were a significant source of cost and complexity for Service Providers to implement (e.g. required custom development). Most of these components can be replaced with equivalent SAML 2.0 functionality.

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<sup>2</sup> NITA has in 2012 been replaced by the Danish Digitisation Agency (DIGST).

- Some SAML constructs are easier to deploy and operate than others (e.g. POST binding is simpler than artifact binding).
- Based on the above, the US E-Authentication program – from which the Danish initiative has adopted several elements – decided to take advantage of the SAML 2.0 standard and at the same time simplify their architecture.

These factors combined a desire to offer – as an option – different identifiers for a given user at different service providers have motivated updates of the Danish SAML profiles – hence this document. Appendix A provides an overview of the changes in the new version of the OIOSAML profile.

**Please note that the previous architecture described in [ITTAch] is now deprecated.**

The architecture supported by this profile is illustrated by the scenarios in chapter 2 *Architectural Overview* in this document.

## **1.5 Terminology**

The following table defines the most important concepts and terms used in this document. For a more detailed presentation of relevant federation terminology, please refer to [Terms].

Term	Description
<b><i>Identity Provider</i></b>	<p>An Identity Provider (IdP) is a trusted entity in a federation that authenticates users and generates authentication assertions or other assertions that vouch for a user's (subject's) identity.</p> <p>An IdP may create, maintain, and manage identity information for Users – in which case it also can act as an <i>Attribute Authority</i>.</p> <p>An IdP may also create assertions for WS-Security messages, and may in that context act as token issuer (called a Security Token Service (STS) in a WS-* context or a Discovery Service (DS) in context of Liberty ID-WSF)</p> <p>An Identity Providers is also known as “Credential Service” (US e-Auth term), “Authentication Authority” or “Login Service”.</p>
<b><i>Service Provider</i></b>	<p>A Service Provider (SP) is an entity that relies on assertions from an Identity Provider (IdP) to authenticate or authorize subjects' actions on its resources.</p> <p>A Service Provider is also known as “Relying Party” (SAML 1.1 term) which now has been adopted by WS-* as: “a Web application or service that consumes Security Tokens issued by a Security Token Service.”</p> <p>A Service Provider will usually provide application services to end users – and as a prerequisite require knowledge about the user's identity, association or role in order to grant access.</p>
<b><i>User</i></b>	<p>Users comprise persons, application entities such as web services, or named machines. Thus, a user is anything identified on a system, or on the network, as a named, individual entity and challenged to present credentials authenticating its identity.</p> <p>A User is an entity that can acquire a federated identity, that is capable of making decisions, and to which authenticated actions are done on its behalf.</p> <p>Users are also known as “subjects” or “principals”.</p>
<b><i>Assertion</i></b>	<p>A piece of data produced by an Identity Provider (SAML authority) or similar regarding an act of authentication. The authentication is performed on a User, attribute information about the User, or authorization permissions applying to the User with respect to a specified resource.</p> <p>Assertion is similar to <i>Claim</i> in WS-* terminology. The term Assertion will be used in general.</p>
<b><i>Trust</i></b>	<p>The willingness of a party to take action based on its relationship with another party.</p>

## 1.6 Pre-requisites

The OIOSAML profiles largely build on the following:

- OASIS SAML 2.0 standards and profiles [SAMLCore], [SAMLProf], [SAMLBind], [SAMLMeta], [SAMLConf]
- OCES, the Danish PKI [OCESPers], [OCESMedarb]
- OIO guide on core attributes [ITTAtrib]
- OIO guide on authentication levels [ITTAUTHLevel]

## 1.7 Adherence to the profile

Readers may wonder which obligations and restrictions they must accept in order to adhere to the profile. Before discussing this, it is important to state that the goal of this profile is to ensure technical *interoperability* for a set of common scenarios – currently in a Danish context – with a set of requirements that aims to keep the integration cost in balance, thereby allowing more partners to join a federation faster.

It is also important to state that this profile does not forbid public sector federations to use other means of integration as long as they also support the integration methods described in this profile. It is a given that organisations wanting to use other means of integration are ready to cover the additional integration cost that naturally will come from supporting overlapping integration methods.

What it takes to adhere to this profile is determined by which role a stakeholder has and which scenarios are to be supported.

For example, if users authenticate by user name and password the sub-profile called *OCES Attribute Profile* is irrelevant in that scenario.

Another example is if a service provider does not want to support federation through pseudonyms then the sub-profile called *Persistent Pseudonym Attribute Profile* is irrelevant for the service provider role.

Therefore, to adhere to this profile, there must be conformance to all sub-profiles that are relevant to the scenarios being supported.

To assist in passing product requirements to suppliers, chapter 12 discusses in more detail requirements for product compliance with the profile.

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## 2 Architectural Overview

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This chapter briefly presents an overview of the architecture in order to provide the reader with the context in which the SAML profile is used<sup>3</sup>.

The architecture will be illustrated in the following sections by highlighting the interactions between entities in different scenarios. The main entities are:

- **Identity Provider** – provides authentication of users as a service to the federation and (optionally) hosts an attribute service where identity attributes can be queried.
- **Service Provider** – provides (web) application services to end-users which require authentication.
- **Portal** – is a (thin) portal which collects / aggregates application services from different Service Providers. Since this SAML profile deals exclusively with the web browser SSO scenario we will only consider browser-based integration from a portal to Service Providers. Web-service (i.e. SOAP) based integration is not considered (e.g. WSRP or native web service integration). *In all aspects relevant to this profile, the portal will be considered as a Service Provider.*
- **User** – e.g. a citizen or employee who wishes to access services and has credentials to prove his / her identity (e.g. an OCES certificate).

### 2.1 Basic Service Access with Authentication


The first scenario shows the interaction where a user accesses a Service Provider directly (via her browser) to get a service with no prior session established. The Service Provider then redirects the user to the Identity Provider for authentication and session establishment.

The scenario shows the following profiles:

- Web Browser SSO Profile described in chapter 4
- Identity Provider Discovery Profile described in chapter 5
- Authentication Assertion Profile described in chapter 7

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<sup>3</sup> Detailed functional and non-functional requirements for the Identity Provider beyond the SAML 2.0 requirements are out of scope for this document as they vary according to the different business requirements.



**Figure 1: Service Access with Authentication**

The steps are:

1. The user requests (via her browser) a web application resource from the Service Provider.
2. The Service Provider determines that the resource is protected and that the user has no current session. The Service Provider therefore redirects the user to his common domain web server in order to discover the user's Identity Provider(s).
3. The Service Provider reads the common domain cookie to discover the user's Identity Provider(s) (via the SAML Identity Discovery Profile). The cookie will be empty in this scenario since the user has no current SSO session with an Identity Provider. The Service Provider will select its default Identity Provider. If the Service Provider supports multiple Identity Providers, he may prompt the user to select Identity Provider.
4. The Service Provider creates and signs an authentication request and redirects the user to the Identity Provider with the request as a parameter.
5. The Identity Provider receives the authentication request, learns that the user has no current (IdP) session, and therefore initiates authentication of the user. The user authenticates with valid credentials (e.g. his OCES digital signature).
6. After successful authentication, the Identity Provider establishes a session and redirects the user's browser to his common domain server.
7. The Identity Provider stores his identifier in the common domain cookie. This will facilitate later discovery of the Identity Provider and reuse of the session (hence Single-Sign On).
8. The Identity Provider redirects the user back to the Service Provider with a response containing a signed SAML assertion. The Service Provider validates

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the assertion, creates a user session<sup>4</sup>, and performs an authorization check on the resource originally requested by the user.

9. If the authorization check succeeds, the requested application resource is returned to the user.

Note that subsequent requests to the same Service Provider can be authenticated via the user's Service Provider session and will not require interaction with the Identity Provider.

## 2.2 Service Access with Single Sign-On

The second scenario shows the interaction where a user accesses a Service Provider directly (via her browser) to get a service when an Identity Provider session has previously been established. The Service Provider still redirects the user to the Identity Provider but here the previous session is reused and no user authentication takes place.

The scenario uses the same profiles as the previous scenario.




Figure 2: Service Access with Single Sign-On

<sup>4</sup> It is assumed that the attributes contained in the assertion are sufficient for the Service Provider to establish a session. This will often be the case if the assertion contains e.g. CPR- or OCES PID numbers. Later in this section, more advanced scenarios will show the interaction when this assumption cannot be made.



The steps are:


1. The user requests (via her browser) a web application resource from the Service Provider.
2. The Service Provider determines that the resource is protected and that the user has no current session. The Service Provider therefore redirects the user to his common domain web server in order to discover the user's Identity Provider(s).
3. The Service Provider reads the common domain cookie to discover the user's Identity Provider(s) (via the SAML Identity Discovery Profile). The cookie contains a reference to the user's current Identity Provider with whom she has a session.
4. The Service Provider creates and signs an authentication request and redirects the user to the discovered Identity Provider with the request as a parameter.
5. The Identity Provider receives the authentication request, learns that the user has an active session, and therefore initiates single-sign on. The Identity Provider redirects the user back to the Service Provider with a response containing a SAML assertion.
6. The Service Provider validates the assertion, creates a user session, and performs an authorization check on the resource originally requested by the user. If the authorization check succeeds, the requested application resource is returned to the user.

### **2.3 Access via a Portal and Attribute Retrieval**

The third scenario shows the interaction where a user accesses a Service Provider via a portal and an Identity Provider session has previously been established. The Service Provider still redirects the user to the Identity Provider but here the previous session is reused and no user authentication takes place. Furthermore, the Service Provider requires additional identity attributes about the user in order to e.g. make an access decision or perform its service. Therefore, it sends an attribute query to an Attribute Service co-located with the Identity Provider.

The scenario shows the following profiles:

- Web Browser SSO Profile described in chapter 4
- Identity Provider Discovery Profile described in chapter 5
- Authentication Assertion Profile described in chapter 7
- Attribute Service Profile described in chapter 10



**Figure 3: Service Access via Portal with Attribute Query**

The steps are:

1. The user accesses the Portal which aggregates content and services from different Service Providers.
2. Via the portal, the user requests an application resource from a Service Provider. In browser-based integration scenarios, the portal will either link to the Service Provider or frame its content (e.g. using an iFrame). Web service integration is thus not considered.
3. The Service Provider determines that the resource is protected and that the user has no current session. The Service Provider therefore redirects the user to his common domain web server in order to discover the user's Identity Provider(s).
4. The Service Provider reads the common domain cookie to discover the user's Identity Provider(s) (via the SAML Identity Discovery Profile). The cookie contains a reference to the user's current Identity Provider with whom she has a session.
5. The Service Provider creates and signs an authentication request and redirects the user to the discovered Identity Provider by posting this request.
6. The Identity Provider receives the authentication request, learns that the user has an active session, and therefore initiates single sign-on. The Identity Provider redirects the user back to the Service Provider with a response containing a SAML assertion. The Service Provider validates the assertion,

creates a user session, and performs an authorization check on the resource originally requested by the user.

7. The Service Provider determines that it needs additional attributes about the user in order to either make an authorization decision or deliver its service, so it sends an attribute query to an Attribute Service co-located with the Identity Provider<sup>5</sup>.
8. The Attribute Service authenticates and authorizes the query and returns an attribute assertion. The assertion is validated by the Service Provider and the attributes are extracted for use e.g. in an access decision.
9. The application resource originally requested by the user is returned (if access decision allows it).

## 2.4 Single Logout

A natural supplement to Single Sign-On is Single Logout whereby a user can terminate her current sessions with all Service Providers and Identity Providers. The illustration below shows a scenario where the user requests logout at a Service Provider – alternatively the user can request logout directly at the Identity Provider.




Figure 4: Single Logout

The scenario shows the following profiles:

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<sup>5</sup> Implicit in the sequence is that the Service Provider may be required to collect the user's consent to retrieve the attributes.

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- Single Logout Profile described in chapter 6.

The steps are:

1. The user contacts Service Provider 1 (e.g. via an application) to request Single Log out.
2. Service Provider 1 contacts the user's Identity Provider to request Single Log out.
3. The Identity Provider determines which additional Service Providers the user has active sessions with (Service Provider 2) and sends them a request for logout.
4. Service Provider 2 terminates his user session and responds to the Identity Provider.
5. The Identity Provider terminates his user session and responds to the Service Provider.
6. The Service Provider responds with a confirmation to the user that all current sessions have been terminated.


## **2.5 Federation using Persistent Pseudonyms**

In the previous scenarios, it has been assumed that assertions issued by the Identity Provider contain information that allows the Service Provider to uniquely identify the user and establish a session. This will often be the case if the assertion contains CPR or OCES PID numbers and the Service Provider has organized his internal user registry with these data as keys. Hence, no explicit linking of user accounts between Service Provider and Identity Provider needs to take place. This mode of operation is commonly known as “federation using identity attributes” or simply “account mapping”.

In order to support enhanced privacy requirements, it must be possible for Service Providers to avoid using CPR or PID numbers in their internal user registries. This will make it more difficult to correlate user information across different Service Provider organizations. Therefore, this profile mandates support of federation using persistent pseudonym identifiers as described below. This will facilitate dynamic (on-the-fly) creation of federated identities as part of the normal SSO message exchange.

Further, it is desirable to support individual migration of locally registered users into the federation.

Note that the strongest disadvantage of this scheme is that the user may (initially) need to authenticate twice in order to establish a federation of identities between Identity Provider and Service Provider. This process establishes “account linking”. Note that account linking can also be accomplished out of band, i.e. using some shared attribute in order to establish a pseudonym.



**Figure 5: Federation Using Persistent Pseudonyms**

The scenario shows the following profiles:

- Web Browser SSO Profile described in chapter 4
- Identity Provider Discovery Profile described in chapter 5
- Authentication Assertion Profile described in chapter 7
- Persistent Pseudonym Attribute Profile described in chapter 9

The steps are:

1. The user requests (via her browser) a web application resource from the Service Provider.
2. The Service Provider determines that the resource is protected and that the user has no current session. The Service Provider redirects the user to his common domain web server in order to discover the user's Identity Provider(s).
3. The Service Provider reads the common domain cookie to discover the user's Identity Provider(s) (via the SAML Identity Discovery Profile). The cookie will be empty in this scenario since the user has no current SSO session with an Identity Provider.
4. The Service Provider creates and signs an authentication request and redirects the user to his default Identity Provider with the request as a parameter. The request instructs the Identity Provider (via a NameIDPolicy element) to provide an assertion containing a persistent name identifier for the user.
5. The Identity Provider receives the authentication request, learns that the user has no current session, and therefore initiates authentication of the user. The user authenticates with valid credentials (e.g. his OCES digital signature).

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6. After successful authentication the Identity Provider establishes a session with the user and redirects the browser to his common domain server.
7. The Identity Provider stores his identifier in the common domain cookie. This will facilitate later discovery of the Identity Provider and reuse of the session (hence Single Sign-On).
8. The Identity Provider generates and stores (or retrieves should one already exist) a persistent pseudonym identifier, includes it in a SAML assertion, and redirects the user back to the Service Provider.
9. The Service Provider validates the assertion. In order to establish a mapping from the received pseudonym identifier to the internal user account, the Service Provider initiates authentication of the user. Note: This might already have happened in step 3. The Service Provider can authenticate the user either before or after the AuthnRequest/Response messages are sent/received
10. Upon successful authentication of the user, the mapping between the pseudonym identifier and internal account is stored for later use. Subsequently, a user session is established and an authorization check on the resource originally requested by the user is performed. If the authorization check succeeds the requested application resource is returned to the user.

Note: It is only during the first interaction between a Service Provider and Identity Provider that the user has to authenticate twice. This is performed in order to establish the link between accounts; in subsequent SSO flows the persistent identifier is reused and the user only has to authenticate to the Identity Provider.

## 2.6 Profiles supporting the scenarios

The scenarios in this chapter illustrate parts of the requirements that have gone into the OIOSAML 2.0 profile. The following chapters detail the restrictions and additions that have been added to the OASIS SAML 2.0 profiles in the adaptation into the OIOSAML 2.0 profile.

To sum up, and for reference when reading on, the following table lists which of the profiles apply to the different scenarios earlier in this chapter.

Profile -> / Scenario:	Web Browser SSO Profile <i>Chpt 4</i>	Identity Provider Discovery Profile <i>Chpt 5</i>	Single Logout Profile <i>Chpt 6</i>	Authenti- cation Assertion Profile <i>Chpt 7</i>	OCES Attribute Profile <i>Chpt 8</i>	Persistent Pseudonym <i>Chpt 9</i>	Attribute Service Profile <i>Chpt 10</i>
2.1 Basic Service Access with Authentication	X	X		X	X (implicit)		
2.2 Service Access with Single Sign- On	X	X		X	X (implicit)		
2.3 Access via a Portal and Attribute Retrieval	X	X		X	X (implicit)		X
2.4 Single Logout			X				
2.5 Federation using Persistent Pseudonyms	X	X		X		X	

Note: The OCES Attribute Profile implicit applies to the first three scenarios because the user is logging in using OCES Digital Signature. If the user instead is logging in with user name and password the OCES Attribute Profile *does not* apply.

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## 3 OIOSAML Profile Content



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This chapter begins the normative part of the OIO Web SSO profile, OIOSAML 2.0. OIOSAML 2.0 consists of a set of sub-profiles of the SAML 2.0 profiles [SAMLProf]. These are described in subsequent chapters:

- Web Browser SSO Profile in chapter 4,
- Identity Provider Discovery Profile in chapter 5,
- Single Logout Profile in chapter 6,
- Attribute Service Profile described in chapter 10.

The goal of OIOSAML is to provide further specialization of the SAML profiles, impose restrictions and limit options left open by SAML in order to ensure a high level of interoperability. This further specialization is described in the following chapters, and structured into the following profiles:

- Authentication Assertion Profile in chapter 7.
- OCES Attribute Profile in chapter 8.
- Persistent Pseudonym Attribute Profile in chapter 9.

Where OIOSAML does not explicitly provide SAML guidance, one must implement in accordance with applicable OASIS SAML 2.0 requirements.

### 3.1 Profile Information

**Identification:** dk:gov:saml-profile:2.0

**Contact Information:** itst@itst.dk

**SAML Confirmation Method Identifiers:** The SAML V2.0 "bearer" confirmation method identifier, urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer, is used by this profile.

**Description:** Given below.

**Updates:** SAML2.0 profile for SSO in Danish Public Sector V1.1

### 3.2 Governance and Management of Profile

The profile is intended to require a minimal amount of central management and governance by Danish Digitisation Agency (DIGST), Ministry of Finance.

The table below describes a few management / governance areas and how they are to be handled:

Area	Comment
Profile Versioning	The versioning and content of the base OIOSAML profile is maintained solely by DIGST. The version of the profile is included explicit in assertions.



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Identifiers and certificates	Participants must choose unique identifiers according to the syntax and rules defined in this profile (must be an URL reference within their domain). Per construction there will be no need to centrally manage these identifiers to ensure uniqueness.
New attributes and sub-profiles	Identity Providers are allowed to add identity attributes to the profile and even establish sub-profiles containing specific sets of attributes (e.g. for the healthcare sector). However, it must be done according to the rules describes in this document to avoid confusion with the “standard” attributes. Special attention must be paid to Danish and International legislation (e.g. “Persondataloven”).
Compliance to profile	There will (so far) be no central authority to evaluate whether a given implementation is compliant with this profile. Note, however, that the Liberty Alliance Conformance testing procedures [LibInterop] will cover large parts of the profile. More guidance regarding compliance is found in Chapter 12.
Trust	Trust will be handled via business agreements between the participants and the trust organization of the federation. It is established technically by defining which certificates to trust.
Meta Data Repository	DIGST will <i>not</i> maintain a central repository with meta data (e.g. service end points) and will not specify mechanisms for automated meta data exchange. It must be handled via agreements between the involved parties.

### 3.3 Errata

Errata and updates to this profile will be published in the OIOSAML group the Digitaliser.dk site:

<http://digitaliser.dk/group/42063>

Comments to the profile should be [posted](#) to the OIOSAML group (registration required) at the above URL. Alternately comments can be sent to [nemlogin@digst.dk](mailto:nemlogin@digst.dk)

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## 4 Web Browser SSO Profile

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This chapter contains a profile which is a further specialization of the Web Browser SSO Profile from [SAMLProf]. Unless stated explicitly, all messages, policies, processing rules etc. of the original profile are inherited.

The steps in the basic scenario covered by the profile are illustrated in the figure below (figure from [SAMLProf]):




Figure 6: Steps in basic SSO

In the following, each step will be described in detail including specifics of bindings and processing rules.

### 4.1 User Agent accesses Resource

This profile contains no restrictions on this step as it is governed by the HTTP protocol. Note that a resource may be requested via a link or frame from the portal, but it will still result in plain HTTP(s) request from the user agent to the Service Provider.

As in the SAML profile, the RelayState mechanism MAY be used by the Service Provider to associate subsequent profile exchanges with the original request. However,

for privacy reasons this parameter must not reveal any details of the request (i.e. it must be opaque).

## **4.2 Service Provider Determines Identity Provider**

In the original OASIS SAML profile, this step is implementation dependent and a number of different options exist. In this profile, the step **MUST** follow the Identity Provider Discovery Profile described in chapter 5. This will help to ensure that the architecture is open towards multiple Identity Providers.

## **4.3 Service Provider sends <AuthnRequest>**

### **4.3.1 Location of Identity Provider**

In order to send the request, the Identity Provider's single sign-on service must first be located. The SAML profile states that meta data **MAY** be used for this purpose but in the Danish profile this is a **MUST**. No prior exchanges between Service and Identity Providers should take place without prior establishment of legal- and business agreements and exchange of meta data.

### **4.3.2 Binding Selection**

The SAML profile allows a selection of different bindings; this profile mandates use of HTTP Redirect binding with DEFLATE encoding based on the deployment experiences from the American e-Authentication initiative. The HTTP exchange **MUST** take place over (one-way) SSL / TLS to ensure confidentiality of the request (integrity and authenticity is provided by digitally signing the request as described in the next subsection).

### **4.3.3 Signing the Request**

In the original OASIS SAML profile, signing of the request is optional. In this profile, digital signing of the request is mandatory and should be performed using the Service Provider's signature whose certificate is exchanged as part of the meta data.

Since HTTP Redirect binding with DEFLATE encoding is used, the signature **MUST** be located in the "Signature" query string described by this binding instead of in the request XML message.

### **4.3.4 NameIDPolicy**

Depending on the used attribute profile, a NameIDPolicy element may be present in the request:

- When the OCES attribute profile is used, the NameIDPolicy element **SHOULD** be avoided. The federation of accounts will not happen through account linking but through account mapping of the OCES attributes.
- When the persistent pseudonym profile is used, the NameIDPolicy element must be present with the AllowCreate attribute set to "true" and the Format attribute set to `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent`

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#### 4.3.5 Requirements for proxy Identity Providers

If the Service Provider is in fact a proxy Identity Provider acting on behalf of another Service Provider, the service provider MUST include a <Scoping> element in the <AuthnRequest> containing a <RequesterID> element stating the Service Provider Identity uniquely as well as an identifier for the application. This requirement shall ensure that the (non-proxy) Identity Provider can determine the real service provider. *Note: a gateway server that acts as a common SAML service provider endpoint for more than one public sector institution is considered a proxy IdP and MUST comply with these requirements.* The RequesterID must contain a string with the CVR number of the real service provider and a unique identifier for the application as shown in the below example:

```
<samlp:Scoping>
  <samlp:RequesterID>
    ServiceProvider=CVR:21334352,APP=ApplicationXYZ
  </samlp:RequesterID>
</samlp:Scoping>
```

#### 4.4 Identity Provider Authenticates Principal

This step is governed by the requirements to the individual Identity Provider.

##### 4.4.1 Single Sign-On

If the Identity Provider already has a valid session with the user, authentication of the user should not be performed and instead single sign-on be used. Exceptions to this are:

- The user may have chosen to opt-out of single sign-on via his preferences with the Identity Provider.
- The Service Provider may have included the `ForceAuthn` attribute in the request with a value of “true”. This instructs the Identity Provider to re-authenticate the user even if he already has a session. The Identity Provider MUST honour this attribute.
- The Service Provider may have included the `IsPassive` attribute with a value of “true”. This instructs the Identity Provider and client not to take over the user interface. The Identity Provider MUST honour this attribute. If the <AuthnRequest> cannot be processed without taking over the user interface (e.g. because there is no current SSO session with the user), the Identity Provider MUST send a response with a status code of `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:NoPassive`.

#### **4.4.2 Selecting Authentication Mechanism**

An Identity Provider may support several authentication mechanisms each providing a different assurance level for the user's identity. Examples are username/password login, authentication via digital signatures bound to OCES certificates, PIN code login etc.

An Identity Provider MAY let the user select among different mechanisms interactively or let the choice be a part of the user's preferences. As stated above the Identity Provider MAY filter the list of presented login mechanisms according to the Assurance Level requested by the Service Provider.

#### **4.5 Identity Provider sends <Response>**

When an Identity Provider processes a request and produces a response, it must follow the rules defined in this section.

##### **4.5.1 Processing Rules**

Only Service Providers with prior agreements may be served by the Identity Provider.

If the Identity Provider receives an AuthnRequest from a Service Provider with which it has no agreement the request MUST be rejected with a proper error message.

If the Identity Provider wishes to return an error, it MUST NOT include any assertion in the <Response> message. Otherwise, if the request is successful, the <Response> element MUST conform to the following:

- The <Issuer> element MAY be omitted, but if present it MUST contain the unique identifier of the issuing Identity Provider; the Format attribute MUST be omitted or have a value of `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity`.
- A successful response MUST contain exactly one <Assertion> with exactly one <AuthnStatement> element. Each assertion's <Issuer> element MUST contain the unique identifier of the issuing Identity Provider; the Format attribute MUST be omitted or have a value of `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity`. If the IsPassive attribute is set and control of the user interface is needed, the following status code MUST be returned `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:NoPassive`.

The background for the above restrictions is limitations in COTS products and a desire to make the profile easy to deploy.

##### **4.5.2 Assertion Contents**

The assertion included in a response must follow one of the two attribute profiles described later in this profile. Specifically, the assertion MUST state the level of authentication achieved.

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#### **4.5.3 Location of Service Provider**

In order to send the response, the Service Provider's assertion consumer service must first be located. The SAML profile states that meta data MAY be used for this purpose but in the Danish profile this is a MUST.

#### **4.5.4 Bindings**

The OASIS SAML profile allows several different bindings; this profile mandates use of the HTTP POST binding based on the deployment experiences from the American e-Authentication initiative. The HTTP exchange MUST take place over (one-way) SSL / TLS to provide for confidentiality of the request (integrity and authenticity is provided by digitally signing the request).

#### **4.5.5 Signing**

The response message SHOULD NOT be signed using the Identity Provider's signing key. Instead, the embedded Assertion is required to be signed.

#### **4.6 Service Provider grants or denies access**

The Service provider receives and processes the response message with the enclosed assertion. In addition to the processing mandated by the SAML profiles, the Service Provider must check that the level of authentication in the received assertion is equal to or higher than the level required by the resource requested by the user.

Based on this information from the assertion, it creates a session with the user and performs an authorization decision for the resource originally requested by the user. If the access check is successful, the requested (web) resource is returned to the user.

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## 5 Identity Provider Discovery Profile

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The Identity Provider Discovery Profile described in [SAMLProf] enables a Service Provider to discover which Identity Providers a principal is using with the web browser SSO profile.

The profile relies on a cookie that is written in a domain common between Identity Providers and Service Providers in a deployment. The cookie contains a list of Identity Provider identifiers and the most recently used IdP should be at the end of the list.

*OIOSAML directly adopts the profile and requires conforming Identity Providers to use it. Service Providers are required to read and use the common domain cookie if they support more than one Identity Provider (i.e. has imported more than one IdP metadata file) – otherwise it is optional for Service Providers. This will facilitate an open architecture where multiple Identity Providers can be leveraged.*

*If a central service is exposed<sup>6</sup> which allows Service Providers to retrieve the content of the common domain cookie without deploying a web server in the common domain themselves, this is also allowed as the net result will be the same.*

*The cookie must be transient such that it is not stored between browser sessions.*

Note, however, that the identifier for the Identity Provider must follow the requirements specified in this profile in section 11.1 (i.e. be an URL reference within their domain).

The name of the common domain is to be determined by the federation organization that the entity is part of.

### 5.1 If Automated Discovery Fails

There may be situations where a Service Provider cannot discover an Identity Provider via the above mechanism. For example, the user may not yet have a session with an Identity Provider or may have deleted the cookies in his browser.

In such a situation, the Service Provider can select its default Identity Provider. If the Service Provider supports multiple Identity Providers, he may prompt the user to select Identity Provider.

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<sup>6</sup> Such as the "Identity Provider Discovery Service Protocol and Profile" OASIS Committee specification.

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## 6 Single Logout Profile

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SAML 2.0 supports the concept of single logout and describes both a Single Logout Protocol in [SAMLCore] and a Single Logout Profile in [SAMLProf]. These allow Identity- and Service Providers to terminate multiple user sessions by exchanging <LogoutRequest> and <LogoutResponse> messages. In this way, a user can perform near-simultaneous logout to all Service Providers whose session originate from a particular Identity Provider (i.e. "single logout"). The user may either contact a Service Provider or an Identity Provider to initiate the logout.

The figure below from [SAMLProf] shows an example message flow:




Figure 7: Message flow during Single Logout

Note: The translucent "user agent" illustrates that the message exchange may pass through the user agent or may be a direct exchange between system entities, depending on the SAML binding used for Single Logout.

The possible variations in the OASIS Single Logout Profile pertain to which binding is used. The choices are SOAP binding, HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, and Artifact binding. Note that the OASIS profile clearly distinguishes between the first request from Service Provider to Identity Provider (which is strongly recommended to use a front-channel binding) and subsequent message exchanges.

In OIOSAML, the following restrictions must be followed:

- HTTP Redirect or HTTP POST binding MUST be used for the first request going from a Service Provider to an Identity Provider. This will allow the Identity Provider to determine the user session by e.g. reading browser cookies.
- Either HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST or SOAP Binding MUST be used for subsequent request/response messages from the Identity Provider to a Service Provider.



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- All Service Providers and Identity Providers **MUST** support the HTTP Redirect binding.
- Support for HTTP POST and SOAP Binding is *optional* for Service Providers.
- Support for SOAP Binding and HTTP POST binding is *mandatory* for Identity Providers.
- All request and response messages **MUST** be signed.
- Communication **MUST** for all bindings be secured using (one-way) SSL / TLS.

See the architectural decision in section 14.5 for the detailed background behind these choices.

### **6.1 Local Logout Requirements**

In addition to the Single Logout profile described above, each Service Provider should also offer local logout for stand-alone applications to the user. A local logout means that the user will be logged out of the local Service Provider application only. The Service Provider will not send any <LogoutRequest> message, and the user will keep any active session with the Identity Provider and other Service Providers unless they expire on their own.

Note that for Service Providers who are part of a portal, a local logout may not make sense and may be handled as part of the portal framework instead.

## 7 Authentication Assertion Profile

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This chapter describes overall requirements for the content of SAML assertions exchanged via the Web SSO profiles. These include rules for encoding attributes and define core attributes that must always be present in an authentication assertion.

Subsequent chapters contain attribute profiles which define additional attributes for specific scenarios including:

- OCES Attribute Profile
- Persistent Pseudonym Attribute Profile

### 7.1 Generic Assertion Requirements

The following section describes generic requirements for assertions which must be followed by all attribute profiles in order to achieve consistency and interoperability. The structure of a generic SAML assertion is illustrated in the figure below:




Figure 8: Structure of a SAML Assertion

The following sub-sections describe each of the main elements of the assertion. Since SAML 2.0 provides a great degree of flexibility, an important goal of OIOSAML will be to tailor the format to local Danish requirements. This will facilitate consistency and interoperability and assure that identity attributes needed in the Danish public sector are properly specified.

Note that the `<AuthzDecisionStatement>` in the above figure is not allowed in the OIOSAML profile. This element is deprecated in SAML 2.0 and is addressed in the

XACML standard instead. Specifically, an <XAMLAuthnDecisionStatement> element is defined as a SAML extension which replaces the current <AuthzDecisionStatement> element.

#### **7.1.1 Main Assertion Element**

The assertion must contain exactly one <AuthnStatement> and exactly one <AttributeStatement> element. All other statements are disallowed since they are outside the scope of the profile.

Encryption of assertions is required by this profile via the <EncryptedAssertion> element. Individual elements are NOT allowed to be encrypted. Encryption will ensure end-to-end confidentiality when sensitive information is transferred. It must be performed with the recipient's public key bound to an X.509 certificate and the certificate must be part of the recipient's meta data.

Note the use of encryption requires that a Service Provider has included his certificate as part of the meta data exchanged with the Identity Provider.

#### **7.1.2 The Issuer Element**

The Issuer element is mandatory and MUST contain a string with the (unique) issuer id. In this profile, the issuer id will be a Uniform Resource Locator containing the issuer's domain. See section 11.1 for a further discussion of identifiers in the profile.

The element is of type NameIDType which defines four other attributes (NameQualifier, SPNameQualifier, Format and SPProvidedID). The Format qualifier is generally allowed in this profile but NameQualifier and SPNameQualifier SHOULD only occur when using persistent pseudonym identifiers. The SPProvidedID SHOULD be avoided.

#### **7.1.3 The Signature Element**

This element is used to hold a digital signature over the assertion which provides integrity protection and message authentication.

The signing rules in OIOSAML are:

- Assertions MUST be signed.
- The corresponding certificate MUST be present in the signers SAML meta data (i.e. signing is not allowed with certificates exchanged out-of-band).
- Furthermore, the private key used for signing MUST be bound to the Identity Provider's X.509 certificate.

#### **7.1.4 Subject Element**

An assertion MUST contain one <Subject> element holding the subject id. Specific attribute profiles define requirements for the subject ID (e.g. for OCES profile it must contain certain fields from the OCES certificate).

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Encrypted identifiers are generally disallowed (see section 11.6 on security considerations for a discussion) in order to avoid processing overhead for individual elements.

The subject element must contain at least one <SubjectConfirmation> element containing a Method of `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer`.

The bearer <SubjectConfirmation> element described above MUST contain a <SubjectConfirmationData> element that has a Recipient attribute containing the Service Provider's assertion consumer service URL and a NotOnOrAfter attribute that limits the window during which the assertion can be delivered. It MAY contain a NotBefore attribute but the receiver is not required to process it.

#### **7.1.5 Conditions Element**

The assertion MUST contain an <AudienceRestriction> including the Service Provider's unique identifier as an <Audience>.

#### **7.1.6 Advice Element**

There are no profile-specific requirements for this element; it can safely be ignored by Service Providers.

#### **7.1.7 AuthnStatement Element**

An assertion MUST contain exactly one element describing authentication of the subject to the Identity Provider.

To support the Single Logout profile, any such authentication statements MUST further include a SessionIndex attribute to enable per-session logout requests by the Service Provider.

Note that the <AssuranceLevel> attribute defined in OIOSAML and used in <AttributeStatements> will also provide information about the authentication context. Specifically, it will contain a classification of the authentication strength according to the scheme defined in [ITTAUTHLEVEL]. The Service Provider must use the <AssuranceLevel> to determine strength and robustness of the authentication method.

#### **7.1.8 AttributeStatement Element**

This element is a mandatory part of the assertion and will mainly be specified by the attribute profiles contained in subsequent chapters.

The purpose of these attribute profiles is to ensure that different organizations use a common set of attributes to match different accounts for the same user and to provide a consistent naming of attributes. This will simplify integration and exchange of user attributes across organizational boundaries.

*It is allowed to further profile the attribute profiles in this specification in a local context e.g. by adding new attributes in a separate name space.*

For example, it is anticipated that different sectors will need additional attributes which can thus be added provided that the requirements to the “ancestor” profile are still followed.

## 7.2 Attribute Encoding Rules

OIOSAML defines the following rules for attribute encoding:

- The <NameFormat> XML attribute on the <Attribute> element must be: `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic`
- Attribute names must be a URI (as indicated by the name format above).
- The <FriendlyName> XML attribute is optional.
- Attributes with an Object Identifier should use this identifier as their name (e.g. “urn:oid:2.3.4.5”).
- Attributes without an Object Identifier which are defined by NITA have the following name prefix: “dk:gov:saml:attribute”.
- All attribute values should if possible be simple text strings with type “xs:string”.
- Mandatory attributes which have no value MUST be set with blank values. Optional attributes SHOULD not have blank values.

For a detailed rationale behind these choices, see architectural decision 14.8. Most of the restrictions are defined to ensure support in COTS products. Examples can be found in the next section on core attributes.

Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on the FriendlyName XML attribute but instead on the Name attribute.

Encrypted attributes are not permitted (see section 11.6 on security considerations). Instead the entire assertion is encrypted.

## 7.3 Core Attributes

In [ITTAtrib] a set of core attributes are identified which must always be part of a SAML authentication assertion. Thus, attribute profiles defined in subsequent chapters or elsewhere must include this core set. However, if an attribute profile is a pseudonym profile targeted for privacy, the core attributes may of course be excluded (see e.g. the persistent pseudonym profile in chapter 9).

The defined set of (mandatory) core attributes in [ITTAtrib] are:

- sn - Surname
- cn - Common name.
- uid - User id
- mail - email address

In addition, the following attributes are mandatory in OIOSAML:

- AssuranceLevel – States how strongly the user was authenticated (see below).

---

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- SpecVer – States the applied version of the OIOSAML profile (see below).

The following attributes are optional in [ITTAtrib]:

- uniqueAccountKey - Unique key to match and synchronize user information across systems and organisations
- cvrNumberIdentifier - An employee's organization identifier

In the following subsections, it will be shown how to encode these attributes according to the rules defined in section 7.2.

See the architectural decision in section 14.9 for the rationale behind these choices.

Note: if the value of a mandatory attribute is unknown to the Identity Provider, it MUST be filled with an empty value. Service Providers MUST be able to handle empty, mandatory attributes<sup>7</sup>. Note further, that an attribute profile may interpret the value of an attribute in a specific context (e.g. uid) or declare that an optional core attribute is mandatory (e.g. cvrNumberIdentifier).

For non-mandatory attributes, empty attribute values SHOULD NOT occur and the attribute SHOULD instead be omitted.

### 7.3.1 Surname Attribute

The Surname attribute is encoded via its OID:

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.4"
  FriendlyName="surName">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    Jensen
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

### 7.3.5 Common name Attribute

The Common Name attribute is encoded via its OID:

---

<sup>7</sup> This is important to note for deployers of the profile since the Liberty Interoperable SAML 2.0 version 2.0 tests do not include empty attribute values.

```

<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.3"
  FriendlyName="CommonName">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    Hans Jensen
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>

```

### 7.3.6 Uid Attribute

The uid attribute specifies the user id in the user's (principal's) home organization (or credential issuing organization where home organization is unknown or doesn't exist – which is the case for citizens).

The actual content of the uid attribute is left to the discretion of the IdP, and should be documented by the IdP.

Note that attribute profiles may specify how this attribute is used in a specific context (e.g. OCES).

```

<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.1">
  FriendlyName="Uid">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    JMogensen
  </saml:AttributeValue>

```

### 7.3.7 Email Attribute

The Email attribute is encoded via its OID:

```

<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="urn:oid:0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.3"
  FriendlyName="email">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    jens@email.dk
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>

```

### 7.3.8 Assurance Level Attribute

The AssuranceLevel attribute which provides the Service Provider an indication of how strongly the user was authenticated. The attribute can have the values “1”, “2”, “3”, “4” and “test” and the semantics of the levels is defined in [ITTAAuthLevel].

Below is given an example representation of the assurance level attribute:

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```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:AssuranceLevel">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">2</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```



### 7.3.9 SpecVer Attribute

The SpecVer attribute tells the Service Provider which version of the OIOSAML profile the assertion was issued under. The current value is “DK-SAML-2.0”. This makes it easier to change the profile in the future without hurting backwards compatibility.

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:SpecVer">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    DK-SAML-2.0
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

Note that the version number is not in any way connected to the OASIS SAML version number.

### 7.3.10 cvrNumberIdentifier Attribute (Optional)

The cvrNumberIdentifier Attribute is used to represent the organization where the subject is employed:

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:CvrNumberIdentifier">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    20688092
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

### ~~7.3.11 uniqueAccountKey Attribute (Retired)~~

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---

### 7.3.12 Liberty Discovery Service EPR Attribute (Optional)

In order to facilitate discovery of a Liberty Discovery Service, the DiscoveryEPR attribute defined in [LibDiscov] is included as an optional attribute in OIOSAML. The DiscoveryEPR attribute may refer to a security token which in turn may be included as an attribute in the same manner as the DiscoveryEPR attribute.

Neither Identity- nor Service Providers are required to generate or understand a DiscoveryEPR attribute or associated security token attribute, and implementations can safely ignore these two attributes in the context of this profile. They must, however, not halt on these attributes.

The name and name format of the attribute are shown below; for details please consult [LibDiscov].

```
<saml:Attribute Name="urn:liberty:disco:2006-08:DiscoveryEPR"
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">
  <saml:AttributeValue>
    ....
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

## 7.4 Sector-specific attributes

It is anticipated that different sectors and perhaps even individual Identity Providers may need to specify their own attributes.

In order to avoid conflicts with attributes in other sectors (and this specification), the following rules must be followed:

- Attributes specific to a sector (e.g. the health care sector) or an Identity Provider must use a name URI containing the DNS domain of the federation.
- Sector-specific attributes must follow the encoding rules described in section 7.2.
- Sector or IdP-specific attributes may be included in authentication assertions following the above rules. However, if several IdP's are available for authentication, but not all IdP's can serve sector or IdP-specific attributes needed by the Service Provider those attributes must be made available from the relevant IdP's via attribute queries. This ensures that a user can be logged in from any IdP and still access all Service Providers in the federation.

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## 8 OCES Attribute Profile

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This chapter describes an attribute profile which transfers identity attributes available after OCES digital signature authentication of the user. This includes fields from the OCES certificate such as distinguished name, PID, CVR and RID numbers plus (optionally) a CPR number which can be resolved from OCES citizen certificates (and some employee certificates) by Government authorities.

The profile facilitates easy identification of the user by a Service Provider who internally use OCES attributes in their existing registries and applications (the CPR number most likely). In other words, federation occurs dynamically via identity attributes and not by an explicit account linking process.

While this scheme provides simple and efficient integration in practice, it is also important to consider the following:

- Since the account linking process is not explicit, the user may not be able to control it.
- If all Service Providers organize user data using the same key attributes (e.g. CPR numbers), it may in theory be easier to (illegally) correlate information across organizational boundaries with loss of privacy as a consequence.

If these concerns are paramount, the persistent pseudonym attribute profile described in chapter 9 should be used instead.

In the following, a set of attributes and their associated representations are described which is either a mandatory or optional part of the profile.

### 8.1.1 Requirements for the Subject Element

In the OCES Attribute Profile, the user is identified primarily via attributes (e.g. CPR, CVR and PID numbers) and less via the subject element in the assertion. Some SAML products may however require a valid subject element.

The SAML Deployment Profile Draft for X.509 Subjects [SAMLDepl] recommends using the Distinguished Name (DN) from the certificate in the Subject. This convention is followed in the OCES profile as shown below:

```
<saml:Subject>
  <saml:NameID
    Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName">
    C=DK,O=Pølsevognen,CN=Hans Jensen,Serial=1234
  </saml:NameID>
  <saml:SubjectConfirmation
    Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
    <saml:SubjectConfirmationData
      Recipient="http://SomeServiceProvider.dk"
      NotOnOrAfter="2001-12-31T12:00:00"
      InResponseTo="Authn_request_identifier_1234567">
    </saml:SubjectConfirmationData>
    </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
  </saml:Subject>
```

---

>

---

When representing distinguished names from OCES Certificates as strings, this profile uses the following name convention to achieve a unique string representation:

- The elements should have the following names: C, O, CN, Serial
- The sequence of the elements should be: C, O, CN, Serial
- Elements are separated by comma
- No white space is allowed between elements

The casing of the elements is not significant. Comparison of strings containing distinguished names from OCES certificates must not be case sensitive.

Example representing the subject from a OCES personal certificate:

```
<ns2:Subject xmlns:ns2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
  <ns2:NameID
    Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName"
    xmlns:ns2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">c=DK,o=Ingen
organisatorisk tilknytning,cn=Brian Nielsen,Serial=PID:9208-2002-2-
958821803505</ns2:NameID>
  <ns2:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"
xmlns:ns2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
  <ns2:SubjectConfirmationData
    InResponseTo="B59A949A6BA2D9CBBD1233268785407"
    NotOnOrAfter="2009-01-29T22:44:50Z"
    Recipient="https://logintst.virk.dk/brs-sp-
ref/SAMLEntityConsumer"/>
  </ns2:SubjectConfirmation>
</ns2:Subject>
```

Example representing the subject from an OCES employee certificate:

```
<ns2:Subject xmlns:ns2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
  <ns2:NameID
    Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName"
    xmlns:ns2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">c=DK,o=IT- og
Telestyrelsen // CVR:26769388,cn=Brian Nielsen,Serial=CVR:26769388-
RID:1203670161406</ns2:NameID>
  <ns2:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"
xmlns:ns2="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">
  <ns2:SubjectConfirmationData
    InResponseTo="B59A949A6BA2D9CBBD1233317006316"
    NotOnOrAfter="2009-01-30T12:09:33Z"
    Recipient="https://logintst.virk.dk/brs-sp-
ref/SAMLEntityConsumer"/>
  </ns2:SubjectConfirmation>
</ns2:Subject>
```

### **~~8.1.2 Certificate Serial Number (Retired)~~**

### **8.1.3 Organization Name (Mandatory for Employees / Companies)**

This attribute is mandatory for companies and employees and contains the name of the organization:

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="urn:oid:2.5.4.10" FriendlyName="organizationName">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    Pelles Pølsefabrik
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

### **~~8.1.5 Organization Unit (Retired)~~**

### **~~8.1.6 Title (Retired)~~**

### **~~8.1.7 Postal Address (Retired)~~**

### **~~8.1.8 OCES Pseudonym (Retired)~~**

### **~~8.1.9 OCES Youth Certificate (Retired)~~**

### **~~8.1.10 User Certificate (Retired)~~**

### **8.1.11 PID Number Attribute (Mandatory for Persons)**

For OCES person certificates, the most interesting attribute is the PID number which contains a unique identifier for the person<sup>8</sup>. The advantage of PID numbers over CPR numbers is that they can be freely exchanged without risk of violating personal data protection acts.

A Service Provider receiving a PID number can subsequently ask the user for his CPR number and validate the PID-CPR correspondence by contacting the Certificate Authority. Alternatively, if the Service Provider is a Government institution with authority to look up CPR numbers it can be done directly without user interaction. With this scheme, the Identity Provider is thus able to transfer the CPR number indirectly. The CPR number is generally a very useful attribute since many systems use it as identifier or primary key.

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<sup>8</sup> The Subject Serialnumber in OCES person certificates can be constructed by prefixing the number with "PID:"

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The PID number is mandatory if the user has authenticated using a person certificate and should be encoded according to the following example (syntax and semantics of the number itself is defined in [OCESPers] and DS843-1):

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:PidNumberIdentifier">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    9802-2002-2-9142544
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

#### 8.1.12 CPR Number Attribute (Optional)

In some scenarios, it may be easier to transfer the CPR number directly in the assertion. The CPR number attribute is optional and must only be included when:

- A formal agreement has been made to exchange it
- The Service Provider is authorized to receive it (e.g. is a Government entity)
- The surrounding assertion is encrypted (which is mandatory in this profile)

An Identity Provider must have the technical capability to resolve and insert the CPR number both for citizens and employees who have one<sup>9</sup>. The CPR number attribute is however optional such that it can be omitted from assertions for Service Providers who do not need it / are not allowed receiving it.

When used, the CPR number should be represented according to the following example:

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:CprNumberIdentifier">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    2702681273
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

#### 8.1.13 CVR Number (Mandatory for Employees and Companies)

This attribute is mandatory when the user has authenticated with company or employee certificates.

Note that the attribute is part of the core set of attributes defined in section 7.3.

---

<sup>9</sup> Some employee certificates are associated with a CPR number; this is e.g. used in the health care sector where there is often a need to know the CPR number of a health care professional.

#### 8.1.14 Employee Number / RID (Mandatory for Employees)

This attribute is mandatory when the user has authenticated with an employee certificate and should be encoded according to the following example (syntax and semantics of the number is defined in DS844):

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:RidNumberIdentifier">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    2342-345623423
  </saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

The Subject Serial Number for OCES Employee certificates can be constructed from the CVR and RID numbers by a simple string concatenation (e.g. CVR:20688092-RID:1180636224562).

#### 8.1.15 Uid Core Attribute

Section 7.3 defines a set of core attribute that must always be included in an authentication assertion.

In the OCES attribute profile, the following conventions apply for the uid attribute:

- The uid attribute must contain the Subject Serial number from the OCES certificate. The field from the certificate is included literally.

This means that the PID and RID numbers will be present twice in the assertion, but this may be convenient:

- If the Service Provider needs a unique ID within the credential issuing organization or he needs the Subject Serial Number, he may simply pick the uid attribute.
- If the Service Provider wants to know whether the Subject is a person or employee or needs the RID/PID/CPR/CVR numbers, he can pick the corresponding (atomic) attributes without having to parse the serial number string.

#### ~~8.1.16 Certificate Issuer Attribute (Retired)~~

#### 8.1.17 Production Unit (Optional – employees only)

Danish companies may consist of several production units (*produktionsenhed*) corresponding to physical locations registered in the Danish Company Registry (CVR). The attribute described below contains the unique identifier of the production unit (10 digits) in which the user belongs:

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:ProductionUnitIdentifier">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
    1202332283</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

---

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---

#### **8.1.18 SE Number (Optional – employees only)**

Danish companies consist of one or more tax units identified by an SE number (8 digits). SE numbers are issued by the Danish Tax Agency, and the attribute below can be used to describe in which SE unit the user belongs:

```
<saml:Attribute
  NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic"
  Name="dk:gov:saml:attribute:SENumberIdentifier">
  <saml:AttributeValue xsi:type="xs:string">
12092018</saml:AttributeValue>
</saml:Attribute>
```

#### **8.1.19 ~~User Administrator (Retired)~~**



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## 9 Persistent Pseudonym Attribute Profile

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While the OCES attribute profile facilitates smooth integration between Identity Providers and Service Providers without explicit account linking, it implies that Service Providers organize their internal user registries to use the OCES attributes (e.g. CPR numbers). While most government organizations probably do this today, the architecture should not mandate this.

In order to support enhanced privacy requirements, it must be possible for Service Providers to avoid using CPR or PID numbers in their user registries. This will make it more difficult to correlate user identities across different Service Provider organizations.

Therefore, this attribute profile has been defined to support federation using persistent pseudonym identifiers. A pseudonym identifier is in effect a random value that an IdP-SP pair establishes and uses to refer to the same user. The shared identifier must be unique to the actual IdP-SP pairing. Each entity maintains a mapping from the shared identifier to their internal representation. The goal of this attribute profile is to define the content of assertions and attributes supporting this scenario.

### 9.1 Rolling Migration

In addition to privacy goals, the profile also allows rolling migration from scenarios where a Service Provider has established a local user id which cannot be inferred from the SAML assertion sent by an Identity Provider. Here, the pseudonym can be used as a link from the federated identity to the local identity.

This will often be the case when a Service Provider is replacing an existing local logon system with a federated solution using an external Identity Provider.

### 9.2 Profile Requirements

The requirements for this attribute profile are simply:

- The only kernel attributes to be included in the assertion are:
  - AssuranceLevel attribute
  - SpecVer attribute
- No other attributes are included which reveals the user's (external) identity.
- The assertion Subject element contains a persistent pseudonym identifier. The identifier must be truly opaque so the user identity cannot be deduced from it. The pseudonym identifier is shared between Identity Provider and Service Provider and is established during the very first interaction between these. On subsequent interactions, the pseudonym is reused.

Below an example of a subject element containing an opaque name identifier is given:

```
<saml:Subject>
  <NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent">
    005a06e0-ad82-110d-a556-004005b13a2b
  </NameID>
</saml:Subject>
```

Both Identity Provider and Service Provider need to store the pseudonym and the mapping to the corresponding internal user identity for future references.

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## 10 Attribute Service Profile

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This chapter specifies an attribute service profile for querying and returning identity attributes from an Attribute Service. It is used in scenarios where a Service Provider after the initial authentication of the user needs further information to e.g. grant access to a resource or personalize an application front-end.

### 10.1 Profile Overview

This profile is a specialization of the “Assertion Query/Request Profile” described in [SAMLProf] which again is based on the “Assertion Query and Request Protocol” defined in [SAMLCore]. Where nothing else is specified, this profile inherits messages, processing rules and other properties of the “Assertion Query/Request Profile”.

The messages exchanged in the profile are illustrated below:




Figure 9: Basic Message Exchange

The steps are:

1. The SAML Requester (e.g. a Service Provider) sends an `<AttributeQuery>` message as defined in [SAMLCore]. None of the other types of request elements defined in the SAML Assertion Query and Request Protocol are allowed in this profile.
2. The SAML Authority (an Attribute Service) returns a `<Response>` message containing an `<Assertions>` with an `<AttributeStatement>` element.

### 10.2 Requirements for Request/Response Messages

#### 10.2.1 The `<AttributeQuery>` Message

This attribute profile has the following requirements for the request message:

- The `Consent` attribute is mandatory.
- The `<Issuer>` element is mandatory.
- The `<ds:Signature>` element is mandatory and the query MUST be signed with a key bound to the requester’s X.509 certificate.
- It is recommended that the Service Provider further identifies the Subject by including the `uid` core attribute (with attribute value) in the request (see section 7.3.2 for details on this attribute).

#### 10.2.2 The `<Response>` Message

The attribute profile has the following requirements for the response message:

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- The <Issuer> element is mandatory.

Any assertion(s) in the response MUST comply with the requirements for authentication assertions stated in chapter 7 with the following exceptions:

- The Assertion MUST not carry an <AuthnStatement> element.
- The <SubjectConfirmation> element in the assertion is optional.
- The assertion does not have to include the kernel attributes; instead the attribute requested in the query are returned.

Thus, Assertions must also be signed and encrypted via rules stated in chapter 7.

### 10.3 Processing Rules

Some error situations do not seem to be covered by the SAML specifications. Differences in error handling may lead to non-interoperable implementations and the recommended behaviour is therefore detailed below.

The error situations which appear to be unspecified by SAML are:

- a) The subject specified in the request is not recognized by the Attribute Service.
- b) Attributes are requested which the Attribute Service does not recognize.
- c) Attributes are requested which the Attribute Service does not want to disclose to the requestor according to its attribute release policy<sup>10</sup>.
- d) A known attribute is requested, but the Attribute Service does not know the attribute value for this particular subject.

In case a), it is recommended to return a second-level status code with the following URI reference:

- `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:UnknownPrincipal`

In case b), it is recommended to use the following approach:

- The top-level error code is set to “Success” if any of the requested attributes can be returned; otherwise it is set to `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Requester`.
- An assertion is returned with all known attributes (provided it is allowed by the attribute release policy).
- A nested status code element is included specifying a status code being `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:InvalidAttrNameOrValue`

---

<sup>10</sup> SAML lacks the concept of “Attribute Release Policy”. Such a concept is part of the Identity Governance Framework which currently is being standardized by Liberty Alliance, and it will be considered once standardized.

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- A sequence of <StatusDetail> elements are included, one per unknown attribute, specifying the name of the unknown attribute to the requester.

In case c), return a second-level status code being:

urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:RequestDenied followed by a sequence <StatusDetail> elements describing the reason for not disclosing the attribute.

In case d), there is no meaningful SAML second-level error code and one can further discuss whether this situation is an error at all. To achieve consistency across implementations, it is recommended to return an <Attribute> element in the response with the corresponding <AttributeValue> element empty and with the reserved attribute xsi:nil with a value of “true” or “1” (see [SAMLCore] p. 31).

Since status codes are generally URI references, it is easy for Attribute Services to invent their own and thereby create interoperability issues. Therefore, it is recommended to only use status code URIs defined in [SAMLCore] or optionally (if the need appears) specify additional status codes through the OIO standardization initiative.

### 10.3.1 Identifying the Subject

The Attribute Service must identify the Subject based on the information in the request. For this purpose the SAML Subject is included. In some situations however, this information is not enough. For the OCES attribute profile for example, the subject contains the Distinguished Name (DN) of the Subject which is not sufficient for unique identification.

In these cases, the profile recommends that the requester also includes the uid core attribute in the request (including the attribute value) such that the Attribute Service can identify the user.

## 10.4 Attribute Naming and Encoding

Generally, attribute names and encoding should following the rules stated in section 7.2. No other attributes are specified in this profile.

## 10.5 Meta Data

An Attribute Service should declare as part of its meta data which attributes it understands (as specified in [SAMLMeta]). Note that this is not the same as an attribute release policy which cannot be defined within the context of the SAML framework alone. Attribute release policies are therefore not in scope for this profile.

## 10.6 Discovery

This profile does not specify any mechanisms for discovery of Attribute Services. Generally, the discovery mechanism present in SAML 2.0 does not cover Attribute Services but is instead targeted SSO. Service Providers must know the location at relevant attribute services through out-of-band discovery<sup>11</sup>.

## 10.7 Binding

Use the SOAP Binding.

## 10.8 Privacy

Before requesting private or personal data<sup>12</sup> from an Attribute Service, the application utilizing the Service Provider MUST when required by legislation prompt the user for her consent or in other ways be able to prove having consent to request the data. The `Consent` attribute MUST be included in the query to accurately reflect the collected consent and the request MUST be digitally signed by the Service Provider. For publicly available data, consent is however not required.

Danish legislation (including `persondataloven`, `registerloven` and `forvaltningsloven`) must be followed when dealing with personal data. An Attribute Service MUST thoroughly investigate legal obligations before attributes are released.

Furthermore, an Attribute Service MUST audit log all situations where private data is released so it is capable of accurately stating which data has transferred to whom and when it has happened, and what type of consent was given by the user. It MAY choose to notify the user when attributes are released but this is not required.

All communication containing sensitive data MUST be strongly encrypted (according to the rules specified by `Datatilsynet`) to avoid disclosure of sensitive data in transit (see security section below).

---

<sup>11</sup> Future profiling of identity-based web services may include a discovery service that holds information about the individual users attribute stores, but that is beyond the scope of the current profile.

<sup>12</sup> For definitions of these terms, please consult the Danish law “Lov om behandling af personoplysninger”, chapter 2.

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### **10.9 Security**

The SAML <AttributeQuery> messages **MUST** be digitally signed by signature keys bound to the sender's X.509 certificate.

Any returned assertions **MUST** be encrypted and signed according to OIOSAML.

The communication between requester and responder **MUST** be strongly encrypted and integrity protected using:

- SSL / TLS transport security (server-authenticated).

SSL Cipher Suites **MUST** be configured to avoid weak encryption.

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## 11 Profile Considerations

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This chapter describes a number of common considerations for the different profiles described in this document.

### 11.1 Naming and Identifiers

In various SAML elements there is a need for expressing unique identifiers representing Service and Identity Providers. In order to ensure uniqueness without central management it has been decided to use URL references containing (unique) domain names as identifiers:

- <http://somesloginservice.dk>
- <http://someserviceprovider.dk/x/y/z>
- <http://someportal.dk/samlsp>

### 11.2 Convention for naming Entity Identifier

Entity Identifiers in the SAML 2.0 standard are *logical* names that uniquely identify a Service Provider or Identity Provider. In this profile a naming convention has been defined based on internet domains which ensure that the identifiers are unique without requiring central administration. Further, with the naming convention defined here Entity Identifiers can also aid in automating the exchange of metadata between federation partners.

If a SAML partner's metadata is available for download from a given endpoint the Entity Identifier for that partner SHOULD be the URL for the endpoint where the metadata is available.

To support having a well known location from which metadata can be downloaded the Entity Identifier SHOULD be derived from the internet domain name of the Service Provider e.g.

- [https://saml.\[domain name\]](https://saml.[domain name])

Example: The organisation with the domain oio.dk should use an Entity Identifier named

*<https://saml.oio.dk>*

If the organisation makes its metadata available for download the metadata file should be available at *<https://saml.oio.dk>*.

For Identity Providers focused on serving a single organisation like an individual authority the domain name used should be the same as the email domain name for that organisation. This convention is created to let the Entity Identifier specify a well known location which can be derived simply from the domain name of the actual organisation.

The above convention does not cover a situation where an organization has multiple SAML installations within the same domain. In such a case – depending on the circumstances - the organization may use sub-domains, or different qualifiers in the Entity Identifier.

Example on organisation with multiple SAML installations where distinguishing is done by using sub-domains in the Entity Identifier:

- <https://saml.a.oio.dk>

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- <https://saml.b.oio.dk>

Example on organisation with multiple SAML installations where distinguishing is done by different qualifiers in the Entity Identifier

- <https://sp1.oio.dk/path1/metadata.php>
- <https://sp2.oio.dk/path2/metadata.ashx>

### 11.3 Assertion ID as Transaction Identifier

A SAML assertion is always required to contain an ID attribute which is unique (to an extremely high probability), see [SAMLCore]. This identifier is thus suitable as a transaction identifier that allows correlation of events across Service Providers and Identity Providers.

Service and Identity Providers are therefore required to use this ID in their internal log files such that all logged events relevant to a given SSO session can be tracked.

### 11.4 Meta Data

All entities supporting the OIOSAML profiles must support the SAML Meta Data specification [SAMLMeta].

Additional requirements to meta data in this profile are:

- All entities must be able to export and import meta data files.
- All entities must include their X.509 certificates literally (i.e. not just references) in order to allow others to verify signatures from *them* and encrypt messages *to* them.
- All relevant services required by this profile must be described in meta data, including SingleLogonService, SingleLogoutService, AttributeService, AssertionConsumerService.
- All attributes supported by the Attribute Service should be described in the <AttributeAuthorityDescriptor>. Please note that if an attribute is mentioned, this does not imply that a Service Provider can or will receive it.
- All entity identifiers must conform to the requirements of section 11.1.
- No proprietary information may be included in the SAML meta data (e.g. in <Extensions> elements) including required / supported levels of authentication. This is to ensure that meta data can be exchanged without interoperability issues.
- The root of every metadata file must be <EntityDescriptor>.
- Service Providers MUST declare which attribute profile they wish to use via a <md:NameIDFormat> element specifying one of the values:
  - urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName
  - urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent



Signing and verification of meta data is *not* required by this profile – see architectural decision 14.3. However, Service and Identity Providers must ensure that meta data is authentic and has not been modified before using it.

#### **11.4.1 Exchanging meta data**

This profile does not mandate any particular mechanism for exchanging meta data (out of band).

Entities MAY publish their metadata documents at a well known location by placing the document at the location denoted by its unique identifier, which MUST be in the form of a URL (rather than a URN). It is **STRONGLY RECOMMENDED** that https URLs be used for this purpose. An indirection mechanism supported by the URL scheme (such as an HTTP 1.1 302 redirect) MAY be used if the document is not placed directly at the location. If the publishing protocol permits MIME-based identification of content types, the content type of the metadata instance MUST be application/samlmetadata+xml.

Publication of meta data locations in DNS records is left optional.

### **11.5 Protection of Personal Data**

Danish Service and Identity Providers must comply with Danish "Act on Processing of Personal Data" (persondataloven).

The act contains rules regarding the processing of data, the data subject's rights, security, notification and supervision.

For details, please consult  
<http://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/>

### **11.6 Security Considerations and Requirements**

This section contains a number of security considerations and requirements for the SAML profiles.

The security of the entire solution will generally not be better than the security of the authentication mechanism used by the Identity Provider to authenticate the end-user (which is outside the scope of SAML). However, use of the AssuranceLevel attribute means that compromise of weak authentication methods or credentials (e.g. a user loses a static password) will only have limited effect.

#### **11.6.1 Transport Level Security**

OIOSAML leverages security mechanisms from the HTTPs transport bindings in order to ensure authentication, confidentiality and integrity of in-transit protocol messages and assertions. More specifically, the following requirements exist for transport level security:

- The HTTP connection used for the POST and Redirect bindings must be secured with SSL 3.0 / TLS 1.0. The connection is not required to use client authentication since that would mean that the end-user would have to authenticate server traffic. Instead, messages transported via this channel will be digitally signed.

- Only SSL / TLS cipher suites providing strong encryption are allowed.
- The SSL certificates must be trusted by commercially available browsers including Internet Explorer, Mozilla, Firefox, Safari and Opera.

The use of SSL / TLS requires that trust mechanisms are established between the communicating entities. Typically, this is done by requiring each entity to maintain a store of trusted peer certificates and/or trusted CA certificates. Secure connections MUST only be allowed from parties who own a private key whose public key can be validated with this store; i.e. a certificate path to a trusted certificate can be established.

It is outside the scope of this profile to specify how these trust mechanisms are set up.

### **11.6.2 Signing and Encryption of SAML elements**

Security mechanisms are built into SAML elements themselves and they can thus be independent of transport / binding security mechanisms. The main security mechanisms applicable to SAML elements are XML encryption and XML digital signing.

Digital signing of an entire assertion and request / response protocol messages is possible via the <ds:Signature> element. The advantage over transport-based mechanisms is that the message will be integrity-protected end-to-end (beyond the point where the SSL session is terminated) and that the protection will out-live any SSL sessions. Signing assertions and messages will also allow the recipient to store them as evidence – e.g. should an Identity Provider later repudiate having issued an assertion.

Since the front channel bindings are used, it is generally mandatory to sign assertions, <AuthnRequest> messages, and Single logout protocol messages with a key bound to an X.509 certificate. Signatures not explicitly mentioned by this profile can safely be ignored by implementations and must not lead to a halt.

SAML 2.0 leverages XML encryption both for whole assertions (<saml:EncryptedAssertion>), attributes (<saml:EncryptedAttribute>), and identifiers (e.g. <saml:EncryptedID>).

Encryption of entire assertions is mandatory in this profile. Encryption of individual attributes or identifiers using more advanced security mechanisms is really not needed in this profile and is therefore not recommended for the sake of simplicity.

All X.509 certificates used in relation signing and encryption of messages must be part of the parties SAML metadata. Exact requirements toward the types of certificates to be used to sign and encrypt messages must be specified in the policy for the given federation. However, federations should consider possible future integration with other federations. This will require compatible requirements towards the signing and encryption certificates. Thus, while not a strict requirement in this profile, in the Danish context it is recommended to allow only OCES company certificates or function certificates to be used to sign and encrypt messages, unless there are compelling reasons to settle on another policy.

### **11.6.3 Verification of Signatures**

A recipient must verify signed messages and perform a revocation check on the certificate via one of the following methods:

- CDP Extensions – can be used when the certificate includes a Certificate Revocation List Distribution Point extension.
- OCSP – can be used to perform an on-line certificate status check.
- CRL – a certificate revocation list can be downloaded from the CA periodically.

OCSP provides the best security characteristics because it always provides an up-to-date answer on the revocation status.

Furthermore, the certificate must be trust-validated to ensure that it has been issued by a trusted CA and that the certificate path is well-formed.

#### **11.6.4 Minimum Required Algorithms**

The following are the minimum required algorithms which must be supported by all Identity and Service Providers:

- Encryption algorithm must be AES with at least 128 bit keys.
- Signature algorithm must be SHA1withRSA or SHA256withRSA with minimum 1024 bit modulus.

Thus, it is allowed to use AES or RSA with longer keys than specified above. All DES-variants and MD5 hashing are forbidden.

When using 1024 bit RSA modulus, federation participants should prepare to upgrade a longer modulus within 6-24 months.

#### **11.6.5 Other Security Mechanisms**

Besides encryption and signing, a number of additional security mechanisms exists which are to be used by the profile. These are intended to ensure that assertions are not misused (e.g. towards a wrong Service Provider):

- The <SubjectConfirmationData> element of the assertion contains a Recipient attribute referring the Service Provider. This ensures that an assertion can only be used at the Service Provider for which it was intended.
- It further contains a NotOnOrAfter attribute (which is mandatory) that limits the window during which the assertion can be delivered. Thus a stolen assertion could only be used within a small time window (e.g. less than 15 minutes).
- The <AuthnStatement> element MAY include a <SubjectLocality> element to specify the DNS domain and IP address for the system from which the subject was apparently authenticated. This will prevent stolen session cookies to be used by an attacker.
- The <Conditions> element MUST contain an <AudienceRestriction> referring to the Service Provider's id. Again this prevents use of the assertion at a wrong Service Provider.

Note that a Service Provider must enforce a one-time semantics for assertions to ensure that an assertion cannot be re-played (e.g. by saving the assertion's identifier).

### 11.6.6 Analysis of Risks Associated with POST Binding

When the HTTP POST binding is used, the assertion from the Identity Provider to the Service Provider is sent in two steps via the user's browser:

1. The Identity Provider sends an HTML page to the user's browser which contains embedded Java Script, an URL to the Service Provider and the assertion embedded in the page (typically as a hidden form variable).
2. When the page is processed by the browser, the Java Script will launch and submit (via HTTP POST) the SAML assertion to the Service Provider.

The advantage of the POST binding is that there is no direct communication between the Identity Provider and Service Provider. This means that the technical configuration (SSL, firewalls, etc) is simple and performance potentially better (depending on the user's Internet connection).

The immediate disadvantage of this binding is that the end user's computer may be easily be compromised by vira, trojan horses etc. and this is further not in control of the federation. This implies a risk of hostile code eavesdropping, modifying or fabricating data transported via this channel.

These risks can be effectively countered by well-known mechanisms including

- Digitally signing SAML assertions and protocol messages
- Encrypting assertions with the Service Provider's public key

These mechanisms are built into SAML 2.0 and achieve confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation of the communication. A fundamental assumption is of course that strong encryption, signing and hashing algorithms with proper key lengths are used.

It is further important to note that XML encryption of assertions from Identity Providers to Service Providers will result in true end-to-end confidentiality, so data never appears in clear text during transport (e.g. when SSL is terminated). The only threats to SAML assertions during transport are therefore:

- Encryption is broken which is highly unlikely when strong encryption is used.
- Encryption or signing keys are compromised so they can be used by an attacker. This can (and should) be countered by exercising strict access control and procedures etc. for these keys in the IdP and SP organizations. Strong protection of keys can be achieved by generating and storing the keys in tamper-proof hardware - although this is not required.

In general, if encryption keys can be compromised, all types of communication channels will be insecure (including SOAP / WS-Security, SSL / TLS) so this is not a problem specific to the HTTP Post binding.

It must therefore be concluded that usage of digital signing and strong encryption can ensure that the user's browser does not pose any risk for compromise of data in SAML assertions.

This leaves the request / response protocol messages between Service Provider and Identity Provider to be considered:

- Request messages (<AuthnRequest>) are required to be signed by the Service Provider. They will further be encrypted during transport via SSL / TLS but

appear in clear form on the user's computer because of the front-channel binding. This means that there is a risk of eavesdropping on the content of the request message at this point (but no modification is possible due to the signature). This is however not an important issue because the request message does not carry any sensitive data. Furthermore, the fact that the user is accessing a given application at a given Service Provider would be evident anyway if the user's computer is compromised.

- Returned assertions are also required to be signed and encrypted by this profile and confidentiality / integrity at the transport level is realized at the transport level via SSL / TLS.

### 11.6.7 Securing Session Cookies

With the security mechanisms described above, the most vulnerable point in the SSO architecture is probably the session cookie established by the Identity Provider. Should an attacker be able to steal this cookie, he may attempt to sign on to services at or below the given assurance level until the session times out.

All session cookies must be transient to avoid persistent storage by the browser. The architecture therefore relies on the browser to protect the session cookie established by the Identity Provider.

There are additional steps which can be taken to greatly mitigate such attacks:

- An Identity Provider should check that all SSO requests bound to a particular session cookie originate from the same client IP address. This will (in most cases) prevent an attacker from using a stolen cookie at another system. In fact, the attacker would have to fake the IP address as well.
- Use of the <SubjectLocality> attribute has a similar effect but the check occurs at the Service Provider side. It MUST be checked by the Service Provider if present.
- A Service Provider can force a fresh re-authentication before access is granted to critical applications. This is done by setting a parameter in the <AuthnRequest> message to the Identity Provider.

## 11.7 Error Handling

In the previous version of OIOSAML, errors were handled by the Authentication Portal which provided an abstraction layer on top of the federation technology (SAML). Since the portal component has been removed from the new architecture, errors must be handled via the mechanisms specified in SAML 2.0 and in some cases by transport level mechanisms (e.g. HTTP error codes, SOAP faults).

The primary way of communicating errors in SAML 2.0 is the <Status> element present in response message. A considerable number of status codes have been defined in [SAMLCore], and additional status messages and details can be included to inform the requester of the problem.

It is recommended that rich error information is returned (when products can be configured to provide it) to facilitate debugging of problems.

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## 12 Guidance on determining product compliance



This non-normative chapter discusses how to determine whether a given product is compliant to the OIOSAML 2.0 federation profile.

Solutions that are compliant with the OASIS SAML 2.0 standard complies with different parts of the standard according to their role. For example, a solution which acts as Identity Provider will have to implement more of the standard than a solution which acts as a Service Provider. To assist in determining which parts of the SAML 2.0 standard a solution must comply with, OASIS has defined a set of operational modes that describe different roles for solutions, like

- Identity Provider,
- Service Provider,
- Attribute Service,
- etc.

For each operational mode, it is described which parts of the SAML 2.0 standard must be implemented and which that are optional.

An example of this is shown in the table below. The tables lists SAML 2.0 features required by the OASIS defined operational modes: Identity Provider (IdP), Identity Provider Lite (IdP Lite), Service Provider (SP), Service Provider Lite (SP Lite), and Enhanced Proxy Client (ECP)

Feature	IdP	IdP Lite	SP	SP Lite	ECP
Web SSO, <AuthnRequest>, HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Web SSO, <Response>, HTTP POST	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Web SSO, <Response>, HTTP artifact	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Artifact Resolution, SOAP	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Enhanced Client/Proxy SSO, PAOS	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Name Identifier Management, HTTP redirect (IdP-initiated)	MUST	MUST NOT	MUST	MUST NOT	N/A
Name Identifier Management, SOAP (IdP-initiated)	MUST	MUST NOT	OPTIONAL	MUST NOT	N/A
Name Identifier Management, HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST NOT	MUST	MUST NOT	N/A
Name Identifier Management, SOAP (SP-initiated)	MUST	MUST NOT	OPTIONAL	MUST NOT	N/A
Single Logout (IdP-initiated) – HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Single Logout (IdP-initiated) – SOAP	MUST	OPTIONAL	MUST	OPTIONAL	N/A
Single Logout (SP-initiated) – HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST	N/A
Single Logout (SP-initiated) – SOAP	MUST	OPTIONAL	MUST	OPTIONAL	N/A
Identity Provider Discovery (cookie)	MUST	MUST	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL	N/A

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The table above which describes a subset of the OASIS SAML 2.0 operational modes has been taken from [SamlConf].

Vendors normally state SAML 2.0 compliance by describing the operational modes their product support. To be able to prove actual compliance with the operational modes Liberty Alliance has included SAML 2.0 in its Liberty Interoperable testing program<sup>13</sup>.

When considering operational modes for the Danish SAML 2.0 federation profile, the following are relevant:

- Identity Provider (DK-IdP)
- Service Provider (DK-SP)
- Attribute Service (DK-Attr-Svc)

The majority of the requirements towards Identity Provider and Service Provider are covered by the operational modes shown in the table below.

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<sup>13</sup> More information about the Liberty Interoperable™ program can be found at [http://projectliberty.org/index.php/liberty/liberty\\_interoperable](http://projectliberty.org/index.php/liberty/liberty_interoperable)



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Feature	IdP	IdP Lite	SP	SP Lite
Web SSO, <AuthnRequest>, HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Web SSO, <Response>, HTTP POST	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Web SSO, <Response>, HTTP artifact	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Artifact Resolution, SOAP	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Enhanced Client/Proxy SSO, PAOS	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Name Identifier Management, HTTP redirect (IdP-initiated)	MUST	MUST NOT	MUST	MUST NOT
Name Identifier Management, SOAP (IdP-initiated)	MUST	MUST NOT	OPTIONAL	MUST NOT
Name Identifier Management, HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST NOT	MUST	MUST NOT
Name Identifier Management, SOAP (SP-initiated)	MUST	MUST NOT	OPTIONAL	MUST NOT
Single Logout (IdP-initiated) – HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Single Logout (IdP-initiated) – SOAP	MUST	OPTIONAL	MUST	OPTIONAL
Single Logout (SP-initiated) – HTTP redirect	MUST	MUST	MUST	MUST
Single Logout (SP-initiated) – SOAP	MUST	OPTIONAL	MUST	OPTIONAL
Identity Provider Discovery (cookie)	MUST	MUST	OPTIONAL	OPTIONAL

 Part of DK SAML 
  Not part of DK SAML 
  More strict requirements in DK SAML 2.0 \*)

\*) IdP MUST support SOAP binding for Single Logout. SP and SP Lite MUST support IdP Discovery

In addition, an Attribute Service (DK-Attr-Svc) is covered by the SAML Attribute Authority operational mode also described in "Conformance Requirements for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0, OASIS Standard, 15 March 2005".

Further, OIOSAML contains specific Danish SAML 2.0 profiles in addition to the adopted subsets of OASIS profiles. These are:

- Authentication Assertion Profile
- OCES Attribute Profile
- Persistent Pseudonym Attribute Profile

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It is expected that the requirements in these profiles can be fulfilled in COTS<sup>14</sup> products simply through configuration of product functionality.

Note that the OASIS operational modes do not explicit mention the following items relevant to OIOSAML 2.0:

- Ability to exchange metadata. Solutions conforming to the Danish profile are required to support generation and import of metadata.
- Support for persistent pseudonyms, which DK-IdP MUST support and DK-SP MAY support

Further beyond the scope of a SAML 2.0 profile, the Danish federation architecture requires that an IdP must give the user an option to opt out of SSO (and thus be challenged for each authentication request). In addition, Service Provider products being used for SSO with persistent pseudonyms must support or be modified to support dynamic account-linking where some form of authentication of the user on the SP side is performed when the link is created.

Thus when considering functional support for the OIOSAML 2.0 operational modes, we can see in the above table that they are pretty well covered by the OASIS operational modes (besides the above mentioned items where the Danish profile goes further).

The “IdP” mode supports the DK-IdP mode

The “IdP Lite” mode supports the DK-IdP mode with the one exception that the Danish SAML 2.0 federation profile also requires support for SOAP binding for Single Logout, where this is left as optional in for the “IdP Lite” mode.

The “SP” as well as the “SP Lite” mode supports the DK-SP mode with the exception that the Danish SAML 2.0 federation profile also requires support for IdP Discovery.

The “SAML Attribute Authority” mode supports the DK-Attr-Svc mode. Clients that want to communicate with an Attribute Service must support the “SAML Requester” mode. Be aware of this – so if you want to establish a service provider that also can do attribute queries, then relevant products should adhere both to the DK-SP mode as well as the OASIS SAML Requester mode.

Thus when looking for COTS products adhering to the Danish SAML 2.0 profiles, a quick way to find relevant products can be to restrict the search to products supporting the relevant operational modes listed above.

Further when acquiring a SAML 2.0 COTS-product, it is recommended to ask for products where interoperability has been verified through participation in the Liberty Interoperable program. The test result from the interoperability testing is documented in a manner which makes it easy to determine for which operational modes a given product successfully has proved interoperability.

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<sup>14</sup> COTS = Commercial Off The Shelf

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## 13 Potential future updates to the profile

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The profile is complete and sufficient to support current Danish requirements for Web SSO. However, the profile may be enhanced in the future to take new requirements into consideration, to detail requirements further etc.

At the time of publication of this profile, there are two known areas where updates of the profile may occur in the future. These two areas are described in the following.

### **13.1 More structured exchange of MetaData files**

The current profile requires that products must be able to export and import metadata files. However, there are no requirements about how the metadata files are exchanged between partners. This is an area where dynamic exchange of metadata may be able to shorten the time it takes for a Service Provider to connect to an Identity Provider. As this area evolves the profile may be updated to better support a dynamic exchange of metadata, for example by specifying a “well known location” where a federation partner should publish its metadata file.

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## 14 Architectural Decisions

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This chapter contains a number of architectural decisions which provide the rationale behind important choices made in the SAML profiles.

### 14.1 Attribute Profile in Requests

<b>Problem</b>	Should a Service Provider be able to specify which attribute profile he wishes a SAML assertion issued under?
<b>Assumptions</b>	<p>An Identity Provider may support more than one attribute profile – in fact, two different profiles are specified in this document.</p> <p>Some Service Providers may have different applications which require different profiles and it may therefore be an advantage to be able to state this in the authentication request going to the Identity Provider.</p>
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Specify the desired attribute profile in the request.</li><li>2. Leave it to some out-of-band mechanism to determine this (e.g. the agreements between Identity and Service Provider).</li></ol>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p>There is no built-in mechanism in SAML 2.0 for specifying a desired profile, but the information could be passed as extensions (the &lt;AuthnRequest&gt; element is extensible). This profile could therefore define a new element for this under a common namespace.</p> <p>While this would allow for dynamic selection of attribute profiles, a local extension may be difficult to support for standard SAML products (needs to be tested in practice). The requirement could therefore lead to costly customization.</p>
<b>Decision</b>	Avoid extending the <AuthnRequest> message since it will require difficult and expensive customization by Service Providers.

### 14.2 Assurance Level in Requests

<b>Problem</b>	Should a Service Provider be able to specify the desired level of authentication in authentication requests to an Identity Provider?
<b>Assumptions</b>	<p>An Identity Provider may support more than one authentication mechanism classified to different levels of authentication, see [ITTAAuthLevel].</p> <p>A Service Provider may have applications with different requirements for authentication level-based on the sensitivity of the applications. In this situation, it can be desirable that the Service Provider can tell which authentication level is required for the resource the user is currently trying to access. This will ensure that the Identity Provider does not allow the user to authenticate by a mechanism that does not live up to the Service Provider's requirements and therefore will not</p>

	grant him access to the desired resource.
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Specify the desired authentication level in the request.</li> <li>2. Treat each authentication mechanism as a separate Identity Provider.</li> </ol>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p>Extending authentication requests with elements stating the desired level of authentication will allow dynamic selection of authentication mechanism and ensure that a user is not allowed to select or use a mechanism that is not applicable.</p> <p>However, a local extension may be difficult to support for standard SAML products. The requirement could therefore lead to costly customization.</p>
<b>Decision</b>	Allow the assurance level to be included but don't require mandatory support by Identity Providers and Service Providers.

### 14.3 Signing of Meta Data

<b>Problem</b>	Should we require meta data to be signed and verified before use?
<b>Assumptions</b>	The SAML specification optionally allows meta data to be signed.
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Require signing and verification of meta data.</li> <li>2. Rely on other mechanisms (e.g. signed emails) to secure meta data.</li> </ol>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p>It is important that Service and Identity Providers never use meta data which is not authentic or has been modified. Meta data contains data such as certificates and end-points which play a crucial role in the overall security.</p> <p>Signing of meta data (and verification before use) is a means to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the data which is independent of how the meta data was transferred. It is mandatory in the E-Authentication initiative from USA.</p> <p>However, some standard software products may not be able to support signed meta data. This has been indicated by some of the presentations from the American egov initiative.</p> <p>Another problem with signing meta data is that it will be impossible to add, remove or change elements by hand. The POC for borgerportalen has for example shown that it was necessary to modify the XML file exported from one product in order to be able to import it in another product.</p>

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<b>Decision</b>	Signing of meta data is left optional by this profile and it is left open to decide what will constitute an adequate protection of meta data in transit.
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#### 14.4 OCES Subject as Attribute

<b>Problem</b>	Should the OCES subject be included as a compound attribute in the OCES attribute profile (see section 8)?
<b>Assumptions</b>	<p>The most interesting user attributes in OCES certificates are located in the subject field. For matters of simplicity and completeness, this field could be included in all assertions under the OCES attribute profile.</p> <p>The subject field may include the following information about the user / company (see [OCES-Pers] and [OCES-Medarb]):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Country (M)</li><li>2. Organization (O)</li><li>3. Organizational Unit (O)</li><li>4. Common Name (M)</li><li>5. email address (O)</li><li>6. Serial number (M) which holds:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ PID numbers for persons</li><li>○ CVR-RID numbers for employees</li><li>○ CVR numbers for companies</li></ul></li></ol>
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Include OCES subject as compound attribute.</li><li>2. Split OCES subject in atomic attributes.</li></ol>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p>The advantage of including the entire subject in the assertion is</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Completeness - all user attributes are included</li><li>• Extensibility - if new subject attributes are specified in future editions of the OCES certificate policies, these will automatically be included in assertions as well.</li></ul> <p>The disadvantage of this approach is that the attribute is not atomic (as is normally expected from an attribute) and therefore requires parsing by the Service Provider.</p> <p>It may be difficult for COTS products to extract relevant information from the assertion (e.g. using XPath expressions) when mapping the assertion to a local account. Furthermore, the attribute is a lot less "typesafe" compared to other attributes whose values can be defined by XML schemas.</p>
<b>Decision</b>	Split OCES subject in atomic attributes.

## 14.5 Binding for Single Logout Profile

<b>Problem</b>	Which binding should be chosen for the Single Logout Profile?
<b>Assumptions</b>	
<b>Alternatives</b>	<p>a) SOAP binding  b) HTTP Redirect binding  c) HTTP POST binding  d) Artifact binding  e) A combination of different bindings – for example a front channel binding for the first message request and back channel / SOAP bindings for subsequent messages.</p> <p>Option a) is required by SAML conformance requirements for the IdP and SP operational modes – but optional for IdP Lite and SP Lite modes.</p> <p>Option b) is required by SAML conformance in all operational modes.</p> <p>Options c) and d) are not mentioned by SAML conformance requirements.</p> <p>Option e) is not mentioned directly by the SAML conformance requirements but is found in many descriptions and white papers. For example, it seems common to use HTTP Redirect for the first message and then use SOAP for subsequent message exchanges.</p>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p><b>SOAP Binding</b></p> <p><b>Pros:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The user’s browser is not relied upon to transfer messages; this may be an advantage if the user has a slow or unreliable Internet connection, or if the user closes his browser before all logout requests have been sent. Thus, SOAP is more reliable than front-channel bindings, especially if there are many Service Providers with an active session.</li> <li>• The single logout process may “flicker” less.</li> </ul> <p><b>Cons:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Back-channel bindings are not recommended by the SAML profile [SAMLProf] for the first request message.</li> <li>• The SP or IdP receiving a single logout request via this binding does not get a “handle” to the user’s browser which may store important session information (e.g. in cookies). This may create problems in identifying which session(s) to terminate.</li> <li>• The SOAP Binding is not used by the other OIOSAML</li> </ul>

profiles. This may lead to a configuration overhead for Service Providers – e.g. for configuring SOAP security.

- SOAP support is not mandatory according to SAML conformance requirements for the IdP Lite and SP Lite operational modes. Therefore, some lightweight SAML products may not support it.

### **Synchronous Bindings**

All synchronous front-channel bindings have the following advantages:

- They are recommended by the profile [SAMLProf] for the first message exchange. This is because the browser will propagate cookies which may contain important session information for the Identity Provider to identify the session.
- The user can be prompted by the IdP whether he really wants to log out globally.

They all share the following disadvantages:

- If the user closes his browser quickly after requesting single logout, the logout requests may not reach all Service Providers.
- If one of the Service Providers fails to respond, the logout “chain” will be broken and the user will not be logged out.
- The logout process may cause the browser to flicker.

The differences between the front-channel bindings are:

- HTTP Redirect Binding uses URL parameters to transfer SAML protocol messages. Even though URL lengths theoretically can be infinite, they are unpredictably limited in practice.
  - The URL length limitation may create problems in cases of long messages.
  - HTTP Redirect is clearly favoured by the SAML conformance requirements as support is required for all operational modes.
- HTTP Artifact binding transfers SAML protocol messages by a small reference (an artifact). The real message is resolved via a second step using a synchronous back-channel (like SOAP).
  - The disadvantage of this binding would be the extra step required plus the requirement for SOAP for the back channel.
  - The binding is not mentioned by SAML conformance



	<p>requirements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HTTP POST binding transfers SAML protocol messages via a HTML form being submitted using the HTTP POST protocol. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The binding does not cause browser problems by many re-directs as described below (pro).</li> <li>○ The binding is supported by the Ping Federate and Oracle Identity Federation products (pro).</li> <li>○ The binding is not mentioned by the SAML conformance requirements. This may mean that fewer COTS products will support it. The Liberty Interoperability tests however define optional features for the POST binding that can be tested (con).</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>The Ping Federate release notes state the following problem with HTTP Redirect Binding:</p> <p><i>“Issuing an SLO request over the Redirect binding causes the user’s browser to be redirected between the IdP and each SP in turn resulting in a potentially large number of HTTP 302 Redirects. The number of redirects may exceed these browsers’ allowable redirect limit. When this limit is reached, the browser believes that a web site is mistakenly generating these redirects and displays the error.</i></p> <p><i>We recommend that for federation hubs that support users with multiple simultaneous open sessions, a binding other than Redirect be used for SLO.”</i></p>
<p><b>Decision</b></p>	<p>HTTP Redirect binding must be used for the first request going from a SP to the IdP. Subsequent request/response message exchanges must either use HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST or SOAP.</p> <p>Support for HTTP Redirect is mandatory via the SAML conformance requirements.</p> <p>Support for SOAP is optional for SPs and mandatory for IdPs.</p> <p>Support for HTTP POST is optional for Service Providers.</p> <p>SOAP is preferred when supported because it is more reliable than HTTP Redirect.</p>

## 14.6 Requirements for Identity Provider Discovery Profile

<p><b>Problem</b></p>	<p>Should the OIOSAML profile require that Service Providers support the Identity Provider Discovery Profile from SAML?</p>
<p><b>Assumptions</b></p>	
<p><b>Alternatives</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Require discovery support from Service Providers.</li> <li>b) Allow Service Providers to skip discovery and hard-code the Identity Provider.</li> </ul>

<b>Analysis</b>	<p>In the SAML conformance requirements documents, the IdP Discovery Profile is mandatory to implement for the IdP and IdP Lite operational modes, but optional to implement for SP and SP Lite modes.</p> <p>Therefore, some SAML products on the market may not support it and the requirement could therefore create problems for Service Providers.</p> <p>On the other hand, support of discovery is an important element in the architecture in order to ensure that multiple Identity Providers can later co-exist. This is important in the future where multiple Identity Providers can easily emerge.</p> <p>To get an indication of actual product support, three representative products have been investigated for compliance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Computer Associates Site Minder Federation Services</li> <li>• Ping Federate</li> <li>• Oracle Identity Federation</li> </ul> <p>The first two of these products are claimed as IdP Lite and SP Lite conformant in the Liberty interoperability test matrixes.</p> <p>Study of product documentation shows that all three products support the Identity Provider Discovery Profile.</p> <p>See  <a href="http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty_interoperable/interoperable_products/saml_2_0_test_procedure_v2_0_interoperable_product_table">http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty_interoperable/interoperable_products/saml_2_0_test_procedure_v2_0_interoperable_product_table</a></p>
<b>Decision</b>	<p>The Identity Provider Discovery Profile is required for Identity Providers and Service Providers using more than one IdP. It seems to be well supported by commercial products even though it is not formally required by SP and SP Lite operational modes as defined by SAML conformance.</p> <p>Allow Service Providers to query the common domain cookie via a central service which means they don't need to become part of the common domain.</p>

### 14.7 Name Identifier Management Profile

<b>Problem</b>	Should the "Name Identifier Management Profile" be required and what binding should be selected?
<b>Assumptions</b>	
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Require support – use HTTP Post Binding</li> <li>b) Require support – use SOAP Binding</li> <li>c) Require support – use HTTP Redirect Binding</li> <li>d) Require support – use HTTP Artifact Binding</li> </ul>

	<p>e) Don't require support of the profile.</p> <p>Note that according to the SAML conformance feature matrix, the IdP Lite and SP Lite operational modes must not support the profile.</p> <p>Option a) and d) above are not mentioned by the SAML conformance.</p> <p>Option b) is required for the IdP mode but optional for the SP mode.</p> <p>Option c) is required for both the IdP and SP mode.</p>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p>The Web SSO profile allows a Service and Identity Provider to establish a shared persistent pseudonym during their first SSO interaction by requiring the user to initially login at both locations. Furthermore, an attribute profile is created to govern the content of assertions in this scenario (see section 9).</p> <p>After a persistent pseudonym identifier has been established, it may require management in the future. For example, if either Service- or Identity Provider wishes to terminate the identifier or change it to a different value or format. This management is handled by the Name Identifier Management Profile.</p> <p>As mentioned above, the profile is optional to implement for the IdP Lite and SP Lite operational modes. Therefore, some lightweight SAML products on the market may not support it. This may create problems for small Service Providers.</p> <p>Note further that the vast majority of Service Providers are expected to use the OCES attribute profile and not establish persistent pseudonyms (account linking versus account mapping). For these, the profile is of no benefit and requirement of mandatory support will only be a burden.</p> <p>Regarding binding selection, HTTP Redirect is clearly the most favoured binding in the SAML conformance requirements. It is therefore expected that it will be widely supported in product implementations since vendors generally seek compliance.</p>
<b>Decision</b>	<p>Avoid requirements of the profile because:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Real-life requirements and needs are very unclear at this point</li> <li>2. COTS support is very limited</li> </ol>

## 14.8 Attribute Encoding

<b>Problem</b>	How should identity attributes be encoded in SAML?
<b>Assumptions</b>	In order to enable a powerful federation and simplify life for Service Providers, there is a need to exchange a rich set of identity attributes between an Identity Provider and Service Providers.

	<p>The required set of attributes includes X.509 attributes (common name, e-mail...), OCES-specific attributes (PID, RID, CVR, CPR) and sector specific attributes.</p> <p>Attributes are exchanged either via an assertion or in response to an attribute query.</p> <p>In addition to generic (federation-wide) attributes, some sectors, communities or portals may need to define attributes with local semantics.</p>
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Use the “Basic Attribute Profile” defined in [SAMLProf].</li> <li>2. Use the “X.500/LDAP Attribute Profile” defined in [SAMLProf].</li> <li>3. Define an attribute encoding based on URIs.</li> <li>4. Define an attribute encoding based on OIOXML schemas.</li> </ol>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p>The basic attribute profile defined in [SAMLProf] basically allows attributes of simple types to be encoded and referenced with a simple string name.</p> <p>The allowed set of attribute values are thus simple XML Schema types (for example xs:string). The names are simple strings and the profile therefore does not guarantee unique attribute naming.</p> <p>The advantage of this profile is simplicity and the avoiding extensions schemas to validate syntax. Furthermore, since the profile is covered by SAML conformance requirements and Liberty Interoperability testing procedures, COTS support can be expected to be quite good. Investigations of representative implementations further indicate that this is indeed the case.</p> <p>Many of the OCES attributes are defined with an OID and usage of the X.500/LDAP Attribute Profile would therefore be natural (the previous version of the OIOSAML profile used it extensively). However, it has since become evident that support for this profile is very limited in COTS products. Furthermore, the attribute profile specification in [SAMLProf] is broken and produces XML that does not conform to the schemas.</p> <p>Using an encoding with URIs instead has several advantages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SAML Conformance requires support of the URI name format identifier “urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri”. COTS support can therefore be expected to be quite good.</li> <li>• Attribute names will be unique.</li> <li>• The scheme can take advantage of the many OCES attributes with an Object Identifier (OID) [which can be represented by an URI].</li> <li>• The scheme is used by the E-Authentication initiative in USA and is therefore expected to appeal strongly to COTS vendors.</li> </ul> <p>As a last option, the use of OIOXML has been considered. For</p>

	<p>example, the attribute name could be the unique path to the attribute's schema in the ISB. However, a number of disadvantages of this approach exist:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Few of the required attributes currently exist in OIOXML.</li> <li>• OIOXML typically use complex XML types which does not fit well with SAML; few COTS products are expected to support it.</li> </ul> <p>After discussion with OIOXML experts, it was agreed that OIOXML is not a good fit for this purpose.</p>
<b>Decision</b>	<p>Use an attribute encoding where attribute names are URIs. However, specify the attribute name format as "basic" to increase COTS support.</p>

#### 14.9 Core User Attributes to include in Authentication Assertion

<b>Problem</b>	<p>[ITTAtrib] recommends that the following attributes always are included when exchanging user information:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• sn - Surname</li> <li>• cn - Common name.</li> <li>• uid - User id</li> <li>• mail - email address</li> </ul> <p>and optionally:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• uniqueAccountKey - Unique key to match and synchronize user information across systems and organization</li> <li>• cvrNumberIdentifier - An employee's organization identifier</li> </ul>
<b>Assumptions</b>	<p>The sn and cn attributes are prerequisites to create a user in an LDAP directory based on the inetOrgPerson (and person) schema.</p> <p>The uid attribute specifies the user id in the user's (principals) home organization (or credential issuing organization where home organization is unknown or doesn't exist – which is the case for citizens).</p> <p>The e-mail attribute is considered of general utility.</p> <p>The original goals with the "core attributes recommendation" was to supply at set of attributes that could be used to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Search/locate a user when direct account linking isn't possible</li> <li>• Supply basic "start" information for a Service Provider that wants to create an account for the user</li> </ul> <p>The ability to locate a user without having an exact identifier mapping to the user record does not seem to be a strong requirement currently. However, the ability to get basic user information in order to create a</p>

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	<p>local user record still seems to be a valid requirement.</p> <p>Usage of the uniqueAccountKey hasn't really taken hold yet. However, as federated provisioning takes hold utilization may begin.</p> <p>CvrNumberIdentifier is widely used as an attribute for employees today.</p>
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Drop those "core" attributes that does not seem relevant in the current situation from authentication assertions.</li> <li>2. Include all "core" attributes in the authentication assertions.</li> </ol>
<b>Analysis</b>	<p>The biggest issue is whether it is relevant to include the uid attribute.</p> <p>Some potential credentials for usage in the Danish public sector in the near term are:</p> <p>OCES Digital Signature, Pin codes (from Tax Agency, KMD, local govt), NetID, Local Net login (Miljøportalen phase 2 federation), DK-AAI credentials.</p> <p>For some of these credentials, situations may appear where the SAML subject is different from the user id at the credential supplier. For example, the subject may be amended to assure uniqueness. However, it may still be of value for the service provider to receive the users correct local user id.</p>
<b>Decision</b>	<p>The attributes from <b>[ITTAtrib]</b> must be included in all Danish attribute profiles – except pseudonym profiles targeted at privacy – with the same provisions for which attributes are mandatory and which are optional.</p> <p>The contents of the uid attribute should be the user id in his home organization. The actual content of the uid attribute if left to the discretion of the IdP, and should be documented by the IdP.</p> <p>Examples:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For a POCES certificate the uid can hold the PID number</li> <li>• For a MOCES certificate the uid can hold the RID number</li> <li>• For a locally authenticated user the uid can hold the local user id (while the SAML subject may be an amended user id to assure uniqueness outside the local organization)</li> </ul>

#### 14.10 Include Certificate Issuer in OCES Attribute Profile

<b>Problem</b>	Should the OCES attribute profile include an attribute which identifies the issuer of the certificate?
<b>Assumptions</b>	<p>A Service Provider may need to contact the issuer of a certificate in order to perform a revocation check or query attributes about the subject (e.g. the current OCES PID2CPR and isLRA services).</p> <p>In the future, there may be several different OCES CAs.</p>
<b>Alternatives</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Include Issuer identification in the attribute profile (i.e. the</li> </ol>

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	Issuer DN from the certificate). 2. Don't include Issuer identification.
<b>Analysis</b>	With the new generation of the OCES PKI, a new hierarchy with multiple CAs is defined. This means that certificate serial numbers are no longer unique across OCES CAs and there is thus a need to be able to represent the Issuer via an attribute.
<b>Decision</b>	Include issuer identification in the OCES attribute profile.

#### 14.11 Naming convention for Entity Identifier

<b>Problem</b>	Should a naming convention for Entity Identifiers be specified when it is not a prerequisite for achieving the interoperability covered by this profile?
<b>Assumptions</b>	Having a naming convention that allows the Entity Identifier to be derived from the domain name that the federation server is hosted in will allow for automatic discovery of a well known location for the metadata file. This can be utilized in a future profiling of dynamic federation where metadata is exchanged in-band.
<b>Alternatives</b>	1. Do not specify a naming convention for Entity Identifier
<b>Analysis</b>	The consequence of not specifying a naming convention will be negligible in connection with the current scope of the profile. However, being able to calculate the Entity Identifier combined with the fact that it also specifies a well known location where metadata is stored will be a helpful building block in future additional profiling of dynamic in-band exchange of metadata. If no convention is described now it must be anticipated that most federation members will have to change their Entity Identifier in the future to participate in dynamic exchange of metadata. No adverse consequences from introducing the convention are found, even if it should turn out that dynamic federation actually will be specified in a way that is not dependent on having an Entity Identifier that is a well known location.
<b>Decision</b>	Introduce the naming convention for Entity Identifier and specify that it SHOULD be followed.

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## Appendix A: Overview of Profile Changes

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This appendix provides an overview of the major changes in the new edition of the OIOSAML profile. First, however, a number of problems and issues with the old architecture will be highlighted to provide the rationale behind the changes.

### 14.12 Experience from the e-Authentication initiative

The e-Authentication initiative from USA has deployed a similar federation architecture for American eGovernment. Experience from this project should be leveraged in the Danish federation and includes the following findings [EAuth-V2]:

- The old architecture is expensive and time consuming for federation members:
  - a. Mutually authenticated TLS is difficult to configure due to lack of product GUI and poor documentation.
  - b. Mutually authenticated TLS requires non-standard ports for web services leading to firewall issues.
  - c. Federation members must develop custom code for integrating with the authentication portal.
- There are technical issues with signing and encryption of assertions.
- The old architecture did not scale well (the authentication portal is a bottleneck).
- There are operational issues with error handling.
- Some SAML bindings are better than others in practice; HTTP Post is for example simpler to implement, faster to deploy and scales better than artifact binding.
- There are usability issues by having an additional party (the authentication portal) interacting with the user and performing many re-directs (confusing).

### 14.13 Profile changes

The following lists the most important changes in up to version 2.0.6 of the profile:

- The Authentication Portal component (and all interaction with it) is removed. Users will instead approach a Service Provider application directly (via their browser) or perhaps navigate via a portal (such as borger.dk) which links to or frames application content.
- The Attribute Service Profile [AttrProf] has been incorporated into this profile and revised to be consistent with the new profile (e.g. regarding choice of bindings).
- Proprietary HTTP variables for communicating selected application and login service are removed.
- The SAML 2.0 <AuthnRequest> message is used for integration from Service Providers to Identity Providers.
- HTTP Post Binding replaces HTTP Artifact Binding.
- Request and response messages must be signed.



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- All assertions are required to be signed and (XML) encrypted to evolve from transport based security to message based security. Note that an assertion is considered signed if it is embedded in a signed <Response> message.
- The serial number attribute now holds the certificate serial number (and not the subject serial numbers).
- The subject serial number attribute from the certificate (which contains combined PID-CVR, CVR, or CPR number) is now split in “atomic” attributes and encoded differently to avoid confusion with the certificate serial number.
- More fields from the OCES certificates have been added to the OCES attribute profile.
- Attributes are no longer encoded via the X.500/LDAP attribute profile. Instead attribute names are URIs.
- An additional profile supporting enhanced user privacy via persistent pseudonyms is introduced.
- The SAML 2.0 Identity Provider Discovery Profile is used instead of implementing discovery via the authentication portal.
- OCES certificates are no longer the only type of certificate required for signing between Service and Identity Providers. The applicable types of certificates (and hence trust mechanisms) are left to be defined by the federations using the profile.

These changes lead to a simpler, more standards-based architecture.

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## Appendix B: References

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